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China's (uneven) progress against poverty[☆]

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Abstract

While the incidence of extreme poverty fell dramatically in China over 1980–2001, progress was uneven over time and across provinces. Rural areas accounted for the bulk of the gains to the poor, though migration to urban areas helped. Rural economic growth was far more important to national poverty reduction than urban economic growth; agriculture played a far more important role than the secondary or tertiary sources of GDP. Taxation of farmers and inflation hurt the poor; local government spending helped them in absolute terms; external trade had little short-term impact. Provinces starting with relatively high inequality saw slower progress against poverty, due both to lower growth and a lower growth elasticity of poverty reduction.

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1. Introduction

This paper aims to document and explain China's record against poverty over the two decades following Deng Xiaoping's initiation of pro-market reforms in 1978. We apply new poverty lines to newly assembled distributional data—much of which has not

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previously been analyzed—and we address some of the data problems that have clouded past estimates and point to some continuing concerns about the data. We thus aim to offer the longest and most internally consistent series of national poverty and inequality measures, spanning 1980–2001. While data are less complete at the provincial level, we can estimate trends since the mid-1980s.

Armed with these new measures, we address some long-standing questions in development economics, applied to the Chinese setting. How much do poor people share in the gains from economic growth? Does the sectoral and geographic pattern of growth matter? What role is played by urbanization? How did initial distribution influence subsequent rates of growth and poverty reduction? How important are economic policies?

Our principal findings are as follows:

Finding 1 *China has made huge overall progress against poverty, but it has been uneven progress.* In the 20 years after 1981, the proportion of the population living in poverty fell from 53% to 8%. However, there were many setbacks for the poor. Poverty reduction stalled in the late 1980s and early 1990s, recovered pace in the mid-1990s, but stalled again in the late 1990s. Half of the decline in the number of poor came in the first half of the 1980s. Some provinces saw far more rapid progress against poverty than others.

Finding 2 *Inequality has been rising, though not continuously and more so in some periods and provinces.* In marked contrast to most developing countries, relative inequality is higher in China's rural areas than in urban areas. However, there has been convergence over time with a steeper increase in inequality in urban areas. Relative inequality between urban and rural areas has not shown a trend increase over the period as a whole, once one allows for the higher increase in the urban cost of living. Absolute inequality has increased appreciably, both between and within both urban and rural areas, and absolute inequality is higher in urban areas.

Finding 3 *The pattern of growth matters.* While migration to urban areas has helped reduce poverty nationally, the bulk of the reduction in poverty came from rural areas. Growth in the primary sector (primarily agriculture) did more to reduce poverty and inequality than either the secondary or tertiary sectors. Starting in 1981, if the same aggregate growth rate had been balanced across sectors, it would have taken 10 years to bring the poverty rate down to 8%, rather than 20 years. The geographic composition of growth also mattered. While provinces with higher rural income growth tended to have higher poverty reduction, growth was not higher in the provinces where it would have had the most impact on poverty nationally. The pattern of growth also mattered to the evolution of overall inequality. Rural and (in particular) agricultural growth brought inequality down; urban economic growth was inequality increasing. Rural economic growth reduced inequality in both urban and rural areas, as well as between them.

Finding 4 *Economy-wide policies have had a mixed record.* Agrarian reforms and lower taxes on farmers (notably though public procurement policies) have helped reduce poverty. Controlling inflation has also been pro-poor, both absolutely

and relatively. Public spending has reduced poverty, but not inequality, and the gains have tended to come from provincial and local government spending not central spending. The score-card for trade reform is blank; we find no evidence that greater external openness was poverty reducing.

Finding 5 *Inequality has emerged as a concern for both growth and poverty reduction.*

With the same growth rate and no rise in inequality in rural areas, the number of poor in China would have fallen to less than one-quarter of its actual value (a poverty rate in 2001 of 1.5% rather than 8%). This calculation would be deceptive if the rise in inequality was the “price” of high economic growth, which did help reduce poverty. However, we find no evidence of such an aggregate trade off. The periods of more rapid growth did not bring more rapid increases in inequality. Nor did provinces with more rapid rural income growth experience a steeper increase in inequality. Thus provinces that saw a more rapid rise in inequality saw less progress against poverty, not more. Over time, poverty has also become far more responsive to rising inequality. At the outset of China’s transition period, levels of poverty were so high that inequality was not a major concern. That has changed. Furthermore, even without a further rise in inequality, the historical evidence suggests that more unequal provinces will face a double handicap in future poverty reduction; they will have lower growth and poverty will respond less to that growth.

2. Data on income poverty and inequality in China

We draw on the Rural Household Surveys (RHS) and the Urban Household Surveys (UHS) of China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS).¹ NBS ceased doing surveys during the Cultural Revolution (1966–76) and started afresh in 1978; the earliest distributional data available to us are for 1980 (for rural areas) and 1981 (urban). While all provinces were included from 1980, 30% had sample sizes in the surveys for the early 1980s that NBS considered too small for estimating distributional statistics (though still adequate for the mean). However, this does not appear to be a source of bias; we could not reject the null hypothesis that the first available estimates of our poverty measures were the same for these “small sample” provinces as the rest.²

Sample sizes for the early surveys were smaller; 16,000 households were interviewed for the 1980 RHS and about 9000 for the 1981 UHS. Sample sizes increased rapidly, with 30,000 households in the RHS for 1983. Since 1985, the surveys have had samples of 68,000 in rural areas and 30–40,000 in urban areas. Though smaller, the sample sizes for the early 1980s are still adequate for measuring poverty nationally (they are larger samples than for many national surveys). Also, the Chinese economy was far less diversified in the early 1980s than now, particularly in rural areas where there was very little non-farm activity and less diversity in farm output than now. The more homogeneous rural economy

¹ On the history and design of these surveys see Chen and Ravallion (1996) and Bramall (2001).

² Included provinces had a poverty rate by our main poverty lines that was 1.9% points higher, but this is not significantly different from zero (t -ratio=0.32). This held for all other poverty measures.

of the early 1980s can be represented with smaller samples. Against this, it can be conjectured that the earliest surveys under-represented remote rural areas that the statistical officers would have had a hard time reaching—probably leading us to underestimate poverty measures for this period.

An unusual feature of these surveys is that their sample frames are based on China's registration system rather than the population census. This means that someone with rural registration who has moved to an urban area (but kept rural registration) is missing from the sample frame. Migrants from rural areas gain from higher earnings (the remittances back home are captured in the RHS), but are probably poorer on average than registered urban residents. Against this likely source of downward bias in poverty estimates from the UHS, the UHS income aggregates do not capture fully the value of the various entitlements and subsidies received exclusively by urban residents, though these have been of declining importance over time.

While NBS has selectively made the micro data (for some provinces and years) available to outside researchers, the complete data are not available to us for any year. Instead we use tabulations of the income distribution following a standardized design in which households are ranked by income per person and all fractiles are population weighted. The majority of these data are unpublished and were provided by NBS.³ The income aggregates include imputed values for income from own-production, but exclude imputed rents for owner-occupied housing. (Imputation is difficult, given the thinness of housing markets.) The usual limitations of income as a welfare indicator remain. For example, our measures of inequality between urban and rural residents may not adequately reflect other inequalities, such as in access to public services (health, education, water and sanitation—all of which tend to be better provided in urban areas).

There was a change in valuation methods for consumption of own-farm production in the RHS in 1990 when public procurement prices were replaced by local selling prices. (Past estimates have used the “old prices” for the 1980s and the “new prices” for 1990 onwards, ignoring the change.) Until the mid-1990s, public procurement prices for grain were held below market prices. Using these prices to value own consumption overestimates poverty.⁴ This practice was largely abandoned from 1990s onwards in favor of using local selling prices for valuation. Using the old valuation method, the imputed value of food consumed from own-farm production accounted for 21.8% of aggregate net rural income in 1990; under the new valuation method this rose to 27.4% for the same year (RSO, 2002); this came almost entirely from a 37.2% increase in the imputed value of food consumption in kind for 1990.

While these numbers make clear that there was a substantial change in 1990, not all provinces switched fully to market prices from 1990 onwards. From our discussions with NBS staff it appears that a few provinces (three–five) used a mixture of procurement

³ There are a number of tabulations in the NBS Statistical Yearbook, but they only provide the percentages of households in each income class; without the mean income for each income class and mean household size these tabulations are unlikely to give accurate estimates of the Lorenz curve. Some of these data are available in the Provincial Statistical Yearbooks or the Household Survey Yearbooks.

⁴ Ravallion and Chen (1999) examine the implications for measuring inequality in China.

prices and market prices up to the mid-1990s. Two reasons were given. Firstly, provincial authorities thought that market prices would over-value consumption from own farm products on the grounds that farmers tend to sell their better quality grain; this is not likely to be a serious source of bias for the poor, given that they tend to consume a large share of their product (Chen and Ravallion, 1996). Secondly, it was thought that local officials in some poor counties were worried that higher measured incomes would mean fewer public resources from the center; this would entail over-estimation of poverty measures in the affected provinces.⁵

With complete access to the micro data we could readily eliminate the inconsistencies in valuation methods over time and across provinces.⁶ Without the micro data we have to find an alternative method. To help us correct for the change in valuation methods in 1990, NBS provided tabulations of the distribution in 1990 by both methods, allowing us to estimate what the income distributions for the late 1980s would have looked like if NBS had used the new valuation method. The Appendix describes the correction method in detail. Our corrections entail lower poverty measures in the late 1980s.

In measuring poverty from these surveys, we use two poverty lines. One is the long-standing “official poverty line” for rural areas of 300 Yuan per person per year at 1990 prices. (There is no comparable urban poverty line.) It has been argued by many observers that this line is too low to properly reflect prevailing views about what constitutes “poverty” in China. It can hardly be surprising that in such a rapidly growing economy, perceptions of what income is needed to not be considered poor will rise over time.⁷

In collaboration with the authors, NBS has been developing a new set of poverty lines that appears to better reflect current conditions. Region-specific food bundles are used, with separate food bundles for urban and rural areas, valued at median unit values by province. The food bundles are based on the actual consumption of those between the poorest 15th percentile and the 25th percentile nationally. These bundles are then scaled to reach 2100 calories per person per day, with 75% of the calories from foodgrains.⁸ Allowance for non-food consumption are based on the nonfood spending of households in a neighborhood of the point at which total spending equals the food poverty line in each province (and separately for urban and rural areas). The methods closely follow Chen and Ravallion (1996).

For measuring poverty nationally we have simply used the means of these regional lines. With a little rounding off, we chose poverty lines of 850 Yuan per

⁵ Yunnan was given as an example by NBS staff, and we verified with Yunnan staff in Kunming that mixture prices had been used up to the mid 1990s. The problem was not confined to poor provinces; for example, Guangxi and Guizhou used market prices only from 1990 onwards.

⁶ In Chen and Ravallion (1996) we created a consistent series for 1985–90 from the micro data for a few provinces. However, this is not feasible without the complete micro data.

⁷ Poverty lines across countries tend to be higher the higher the mean income of the country, though with an initially low elasticity at low income (Ravallion, 1994).

⁸ Without the latter condition, the rural food bundles were deemed to be nutritionally inadequate (in terms of protein and other nutrients) while the urban bundles were considered to be preferable. The condition was binding on both urban and rural bundles.

year for rural areas and 1200 Yuan for urban areas, both in 2002 prices. (Ideally one would build up all national poverty measures by applying the regional poverty lines to the provincial distributions and then aggregating. However, this would entail a substantial loss of information given that we have only 10–12 years of rural data at province level.) We use the 2002 differential between the urban and rural lines to calculate an urban equivalent to the 300 Yuan rural line at 1990 prices.

Finally, we convert to prices at each date using the rural and urban Consumer Price Indices (CPI) produced by NBS. For rural areas, there is a concern that the rural prices collected by NBS relate to markets in close proximity to urban centers. (We do not have hard evidence of this but the possibility was noted by provincial NBS offices in our interviews.) We return to this point in the next section.

We also use these urban and rural poverty lines as deflators for urban–rural cost-of-living (COL) adjustments in forming aggregate inequality measures and for measuring inequality between urban and rural areas. Past work in the literature on inequality in China has ignored the COL difference between urban and rural areas, and we will see that this does matter. However, our COL adjustments are not ideal, in that a common deflator is applied to all levels of income.

We provide three poverty measures: The *headcount index* (H) is the percentage of the population living in households with income per person below the poverty line. The *poverty gap index* (PG) gives the mean distance below the poverty line as a proportion of that line (the mean is taken over the whole population, counting the non-poor as having zero gap.) For the *squared poverty gap index* (SPG) the individual poverty gaps are weighted by the gaps themselves, so as to reflect inequality amongst the poor (Foster et al., 1984). For all three, the aggregate measure is the population-weighted mean of the measures across any complete partition of the population into subgroups. Datt and Ravallion (1992) describe our methods for estimating the Lorenz curves and calculating these poverty measures from the grouped data provided by the NBS tabulations.

3. Poverty measures for China 1981–2001

The urban population share rose from 19% in 1980 to 39% in 2002 (Table 1).⁹ This may be a surprisingly high pace of urbanization, given that there were governmental restrictions on migration (though less so since the mid-1990s).¹⁰ We do not know how much this stemmed from urban expansion into rural areas versus actual migration from rural to urban areas.

⁹ The urban population shares are based on the data provided by the census bureau of NBS, including the annual sample surveys used between the decadal censuses. These data are based on addresses rather than registrations so the aforementioned problem of undercounting the urban population based on registrations does not arise.

¹⁰ For example, in India (with no such restrictions) the share of the population living in urban areas increased from 23% to 28% over the same period.

Table 1
Summary statistics

	Urban pop. share (%)	Urban–rural COL diff.	Mean household income per person*			Mean (adjusted for COL differential)*	
			Rural	Urban	National	Urban	National
1980	19.39	19.35	191.33	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1981	20.16	19.42	218.19	486.28	272.24	407.20	256.29
1982	21.13	19.50	258.86	514.94	312.97	430.92	295.22
1983	21.62	20.09	292.46	536.94	345.32	447.10	325.89
1984	23.01	20.03	326.35	598.46	388.96	498.59	365.98
1985	23.71	23.20	368.18	604.06	424.11	490.32	397.14
1986	24.52	26.67	377.29	686.49	453.11	541.97	417.67
1987	25.32	29.74	388.74	702.93	468.29	541.78	427.49
1988	25.81	33.30	391.83	686.51	467.89	515.01	423.62
1989	26.21	29.99	363.83	687.38	448.63	528.79	407.07
1990	26.41	25.94	357.20	744.90	459.59	591.48	419.07
1991	26.94	29.38	360.48	798.11	478.38	616.87	429.55
1992	27.46	34.23	381.03	875.78	516.89	652.44	455.56
1993	27.99	37.10	394.00	959.18	552.19	699.61	479.54
1994	28.51	38.90	423.05	1040.88	599.19	749.37	516.08
1995	29.04	38.08	465.25	1091.69	647.17	790.63	559.74
1996	30.48	39.24	526.41	1133.63	711.49	814.17	614.12
1997	31.91	40.05	557.32	1172.58	753.65	837.24	646.64
1998	33.35	40.62	582.30	1240.19	801.71	881.95	682.23
1999	34.78	40.90	604.39	1355.87	865.75	962.27	728.86
2000	36.22	42.17	616.79	1442.99	916.04	1014.95	761.00
2001	37.66	42.03	642.57	1565.20	990.03	1102.00	815.59
2002	39.09	41.18	n.a.	1775.41	n.a.	1257.58	n.a.

*Yuan/person/year at 1980 prices.

The cost-of-living differential rises over time, from 19% to 41% in 2002. The divergence between urban and rural inflation rates started in the mid-1980s. It could well reflect the impact of urbanization on the prices of commodities that are not traded between sectors, such as housing and services.¹¹ The (partial) removal of subsidies on urban commodities (including services) could also have shown up in a higher rate of inflation in urban areas. Given that the urban rate of inflation exceeded the rural rate, the aforementioned possibility of an “urban bias” in the rural CPI (Section 2) suggests that we may have underestimated the rate of rural poverty reduction since the mid-1980s.

Table 1 also gives our estimates of mean income for rural and urban areas. The large disparities in mean incomes between urban and rural areas echo a well-known feature of the Chinese economy, though our COL adjustment narrows the differential

¹¹ A breakdown of the urban and rural CPI by type of commodity is only available from 1990 onwards. Over this period, the prices of services increased far more than other goods, and far more in urban areas than rural areas. While the overall urban CPI increased by a factor of 2.16 from 1990–2001, as compared to 1.92 for the rural CPI, the services component increased by a factor of 4.83, versus 3.81 in rural areas. Similarly, housing prices increased more steeply in urban areas, and more so than the overall CPI.

Table 2
Poverty in rural China, 1980–2001

	Poverty measures (%)					
	Old poverty line			New poverty line*		
	<i>H</i>	PG	SPG	<i>H</i>	PG	SPG
1980	40.65	10.30	3.67	75.70	26.51	11.95
1981	28.62	6.84	2.35	64.67	19.99	8.44
1982	17.33	3.66	1.10	47.78	12.85	4.95
1983	13.34	2.50	0.65	38.38	9.89	3.63
1984	9.87	1.58	0.35	30.93	7.51	2.58
1985	8.82	1.46	0.34	22.67	5.23	1.71
1986	9.85	1.92	0.52	23.50	5.99	2.16
1987	8.29	1.44	0.35	21.91	5.33	1.83
1988	7.99	1.31	0.35	23.15	5.52	1.89
1989	11.88	2.38	0.66	29.17	7.98	3.05
1990	10.55	1.85	0.44	29.18	7.60	2.76
1991	11.66	2.84	1.17	29.72	8.52	3.43
1992	9.83	2.22	0.86	28.18	7.59	3.03
1993	11.29	2.42	0.71	27.40	7.84	3.13
1994	10.41	2.74	1.00	23.32	7.24	3.19
1995	7.83	2.13	1.01	20.43	5.66	2.16
1996	4.20	1.13	0.58	13.82	3.55	1.50
1997	4.83	0.80	0.18	13.33	3.45	1.23
1998	3.24	0.36	0.05	11.58	2.61	0.81
1999	3.43	0.42	0.07	11.40	2.66	0.85
2000	5.12	0.95	0.24	12.96	3.55	1.33
2001	4.75	0.81	0.19	12.49	3.32	1.21

*Poverty line is 850 Yuan per person per year in 2002; rural CPI used to deflate.

considerably.¹² We will return in Section 5 to discuss the implications for urban–rural inequality.

Table 2 gives our rural poverty measures. Table 3 gives our estimates for urban areas. For all years and all measures, rural poverty incidence exceeds urban poverty, and by a wide margin. Rural poverty measures show a strong downward trend, though with some reversals, notably in the late 1980s, early 1990s and in the last two years of our series. The urban measures also show a trend decline, though with even greater volatility.

Table 4 gives the national aggregates and Fig. 1 plots the national headcount indices for both poverty lines. By the new lines, the headcount index falls from 53% in 1981 to 8% in 2001. Conservatively assuming the 1981 urban number for 1980, the national index was 62% in 1980. There was more progress in some periods than others. There was a dramatic decline in poverty in the first few years of the 1980s. The bulk of this decline came from rural areas. By our new poverty line, the rural

¹² Since the latter adjustment is based on the poverty lines, it may not be appropriate for the mean (at least toward the end of the period). But it is our best available option.

Table 3
Poverty in urban China, 1981–2002

	Poverty measures (%)					
	Old poverty line			New poverty line*		
	<i>H</i>	PG	SPG	<i>H</i>	PG	SPG
1981	0.82	0.22	0.14	6.01	1.01	0.35
1982	0.15	0.03	0.02	2.16	0.27	0.07
1983	0.12	0.03	0.01	1.56	0.20	0.05
1984	0.29	0.08	0.05	1.27	0.23	0.09
1985	0.23	0.07	0.05	1.08	0.21	0.09
1986	0.22	0.00	0.00	3.23	0.46	0.09
1987	0.78	0.31	0.30	1.62	0.48	0.33
1988	0.77	0.26	0.20	2.07	0.50	0.27
1989	3.66	1.49	0.86	7.05	2.72	1.55
1990	0.75	0.33	0.33	2.58	0.24	0.03
1991	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.66	0.53	0.38
1992	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.13	0.36	0.26
1993	0.50	0.16	0.11	1.01	0.25	0.14
1994	0.47	0.16	0.11	1.19	0.30	0.15
1995	0.31	0.13	0.11	0.85	0.24	0.15
1996	0.18	0.07	0.06	0.61	0.16	0.09
1997	0.20	0.09	0.08	0.70	0.19	0.11
1998	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.16	0.43	0.34
1999	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.57	0.18	0.12
2000	0.20	0.09	0.08	0.63	0.18	0.11
2001	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.50	0.16	0.11
2002	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.54	0.24	0.22

*Poverty line is 1200 Yuan per person per year in 2002; urban CPI used to deflate.

poverty rate fell from 65% in 1981 (76% in 1980) to 23% in 1985 (Table 2). On weighting by the rural population share, this accounts for 77% of the decline in the national poverty rate between 1981 and 2001. By contrast, the late 1980s and early 1990s were a difficult period for China's poor. Progress was restored around the mid-1990s, though the late 1990s saw a marked deceleration, with signs of rising poverty in rural areas.¹³

We can decompose the change in national poverty into a “population shift effect” and a “within sector” effect.¹⁴ Letting P_t denote the poverty measure for date t , while P_t^j

¹³ Using different data, Benjamin et al. (2005) also find evidence of a deceleration in the rate of growth in rural incomes in the later part of the 1990s. Indeed, their results indicate a decline in rural incomes, while we still find gains over this period. This could reflect a difference in data sources. Benjamin et al., use survey data for nine provinces collected by Ministry of Agriculture, for which the sample frame is only for agricultural households, while the RHS sample frame is the rural population as whole. The RHS data also indicate stagnation in the growth of rural household income from agriculture; by contrast, rural *non-farm* activities actually did well in this period; income from agriculture accounted for 61% of China's rural net income in 1995; this had fallen to 48% by 2000 (RSO, 2002).

¹⁴ This is one of the decompositions for poverty measures proposed by Ravallion and Huppi (1991).

Table 4
Poverty in China as a whole, 1981–2001

	Poverty measures (%)					
	Old poverty line			New poverty line*		
	H	PG	SPG	H	PG	SPG
1981	23.02	5.51	1.90	52.84	16.17	6.81
1982	13.70	2.89	0.87	38.14	10.19	3.92
1983	10.48	1.96	0.52	30.42	7.80	2.85
1984	7.67	1.24	0.28	24.11	5.83	2.01
1985	6.78	1.13	0.27	17.55	4.04	1.33
1986	7.49	1.45	0.40	18.53	4.63	1.65
1987	6.39	1.15	0.33	16.77	4.10	1.45
1988	6.13	1.04	0.31	17.71	4.23	1.47
1989	9.73	2.15	0.71	23.37	6.60	2.65
1990	7.96	1.45	0.41	22.15	5.65	2.04
1991	8.52	2.08	0.85	22.16	6.37	2.61
1992	7.13	1.61	0.63	20.75	5.61	2.27
1993	8.27	1.79	0.54	20.01	5.72	2.29
1994	7.58	2.00	0.74	17.01	5.26	2.32
1995	5.65	1.55	0.75	14.74	4.08	1.58
1996	2.97	0.81	0.42	9.79	2.52	1.07
1997	3.35	0.58	0.15	9.30	2.41	0.87
1998	2.16	0.24	0.04	8.10	1.88	0.65
1999	2.24	0.27	0.05	7.63	1.79	0.60
2000	3.34	0.64	0.18	8.49	2.33	0.89
2001	2.96	0.51	0.12	7.97	2.13	0.80

*Population's weighted means of poverty measures also taken from Tables 5.

is the measure for sector $i = u, r$ (urban, rural), with corresponding population shares $n_{t,i}^i$, we can write an exact decomposition of the change in poverty between $t = 1981$ and $t = 2001$ as:

$$P_{01} - P_{81} = \underbrace{[n_{01}^r (P_{01}^r - P_{81}^r) + n_{01}^u (P_{01}^u - P_{81}^u)]}_{\text{Within-sector effect}} + \underbrace{[(P_{81}^u - P_{81}^r)(n_{01}^u - n_{81}^u)]}_{\text{Population shift effect}} \quad (1)$$

The within-sector effect is the change in poverty weighted by the final year population shares while the population shift effect measures the contribution of urbanization, weighted by the initial urban–rural difference in poverty measures. The “population shift effect” should be interpreted as the *partial* effect of urban–rural migration, in that it does not allow for any effects of migration and remittances on poverty levels within urban and rural areas.¹⁵ For example, urbanization may be an indirect cause of higher rural incomes, but this would not be revealed by the decomposition in (1). Thus it is a descriptive decomposition rather than causal. (Our regression-based decomposition in the next section will be better able to pick up indirect effects).

¹⁵ This can be interpreted as a “Kuznets process” of migration whereby a representative slice of the rural distribution is transformed into a representative slice of the urban distribution.




Fig. 1. National incidence of poverty in China 1981–2001.

Table 5 gives the decomposition based on Eq. (1). We find that 35% points of the 45% point decline in the national headcount index is accountable to the within-sector term; within this, 33% points was due to falling poverty within rural areas while only 2% points was due to falling poverty in urban areas. The population shift from rural to urban areas accounted for 10% points. The other poverty measures tell a very similar story, though the rural share is slightly higher for SPG than PG, and lowest for *H*. As can be seen from the lower panel of Table 5, the pattern is also similar for the period 1991–2001, the main difference being that the “within-urban” share falls to zero using the old poverty line, with the rural share rising to around 80%.

So we find that 75–80% of the drop in national poverty incidence is accountable to poverty reduction within the rural sector; most of the rest is attributable to urbanization of the population. Understanding what has driven rural poverty reduction is clearly of first-order importance to understanding the country’s overall success against poverty.

4. Poverty reduction and economic growth

We begin by examining the relationship between our estimated poverty measures and mean incomes, after which we take a closer look at the role played by the pattern of growth.

4.1. The relationship between poverty and growth

Poverty in China fell as mean income rose; the regression coefficient of the log national headcount index on the log national mean is -1.43 , with a *t*-ratio of 15.02. However, this is potentially deceptive, given that both series are non-stationary; the residuals show strong

Table 5
Decomposition of the change in poverty

	Poverty measures (% point change 1981–2001)					
	Old poverty line			New poverty line		
	<i>H</i>	PG	SPG	<i>H</i>	PG	SPG
<i>1981–2001</i>						
Within rural	–14.88 (74.2)	–3.76 (75.2)	–1.35 (75.7)	–32.53 (72.5)	–10.39 (74.0)	–4.51 (75.0)
Within urban	–0.31 (1.5)	–0.08 (1.7)	–0.05 (3.0)	–2.08 (4.6)	–0.32 (2.3)	–0.09 (1.5)
Population shift (rural to urban)	–4.87 (24.3)	–1.16 (23.2)	–0.39 (21.7)	–10.27 (22.9)	–3.32 (23.7)	–1.42 (23.6)
Total change	–20.06	–5.00	–1.78	–44.87	–14.04	–6.01
<i>1991–2001</i>						
Within rural	–4.31 (77.5)	–1.27 (80.9)	–0.61 (83.7)	–10.74 (75.7)	–3.24 (76.4)	–1.38 (76.2)
Within urban	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.0)	–0.44 (3.1)	–0.14 (3.3)	–0.10 (5.5)
Population shift (rural to urban)	–1.25 (22.5)	–0.30 (19.1)	–0.13 (17.2)	–3.01 (21.2)	–0.86 (20.3)	–0.33 (18.2)
Total change	–5.56	–1.57	–0.73	–14.19	–4.24	–1.81

% of total in parentheses.

serial dependence (the Durbin–Watson statistics is 0.62). Differencing deals with this problem.¹⁶ Table 6 gives regressions of the log difference in each poverty measure against the log difference in mean income per capita. There is a possible upward bias in the OLS estimates stemming from common measurement errors in the dependent and independent variable; when the mean is overestimated the poverty measure will be underestimated. Following Ravallion (2001) we use the GDP growth rate as the instrument for the growth rate in mean income from the surveys, under the assumption that measurement errors in the two data sources are uncorrelated. (China’s national accounts have been based largely on administrative data.) Both the OLS and IVE results in Table 6 confirm studies for other countries indicating that periods of higher economic growth tended to be associated with higher rates of poverty reduction.¹⁷ The implied elasticity of poverty reduction to growth is over three for the headcount index and around four for the poverty gap measures. The IVE elasticity is similar to that for OLS, suggesting that the aforementioned problem of correlated measurement errors is not a serious source of bias.

¹⁶ The correlograms of the first differences of the three log poverty measures shows no significant autocorrelations. While the first difference of the log mean still shows mild positive serial correlation, the residuals of the regression of the log difference of the poverty measure on the on the log difference of the mean shows no sign of serial correlation.

¹⁷ Evidence on this point for other countries can be found in Ravallion (2001).

Table 6
 Regressions of the rate of poverty reduction on rate of growth in household mean income from the surveys

	OLS		IVE	
<i>Headcount index (log difference)</i>				
Constant	0.111 (3.923)	0.037 (3.200)	0.132 (2.098)	0.039 (3.312)
Mean income (log difference)	-3.187 (-8.745)	-2.660 (-15.776)	-3.512 (-3.886)	-2.682 (-13.615)
Gini index (log difference)		3.491 (10.715)		3.488 (10.858)
Gini index (log.diff.)		0.183 (6.445)		0.185 (6.183)
x (year-2000)		-0.701 (-4.200)		-0.704 (-4.196)
AR(1)				
R^2	0.644	0.935	0.637	0.935
D-W	2.233	2.680	2.146	2.691
<i>Poverty gap index (log difference)</i>				
Constant	0.159 (3.365)	0.029 (1.244)	0.179 (2.016)	0.037 (1.576)
Mean income (log difference)	-3.922 (7.596)	-2.881 (-11.865)	-4.240 (3.538)	-2.995 (-10.548)
Gini index (log difference)		5.273 (7.031)		5.254 (7.121)
Gini index x (year-2000)		0.245 (4.155)		0.250 (4.102)
AR(1)		-0.418 (-1.934)		-0.432 (-2.120)
R^2	0.561	0.908	0.557	0.907
D-W	2.039	2.252	1.990	2.270
<i>Squared poverty gap index (log difference)</i>				
Constant	0.185 (2.882)	0.007 (0.204)	0.204 (1.759)	0.095 (1.204)
Mean income (log difference)	-4.270 (-6.381)	-2.737 (-6.496)	-4.569 (-2.946)	-3.994 (-4.099)
Gini index (log difference)		6.025 (4.207)		5.781 (3.779)
Gini index x (year-2000)		0.212 (2.090)		0.239 (2.231)
R^2	0.499	0.873	0.497	0.839
D-W	2.070	2.221	2.047	2.175

Poverty measures based on new poverty lines. t-ratios corrected for heteroscedasticity in parentheses. The Instrumental Variables Estimator (IVE) uses the growth rate (log difference) in GDP per capita as the instrument for the growth rate in the survey mean. An interaction effect between time and the change in the log mean was also tested but (highly) insignificant in all cases.

Notice that the intercepts are positive and significant in Table 6. Our OLS results imply that at zero growth, the headcount index would have risen at 11% per year (16% for PG and 19% for SPG). So falling poverty in China has been the net outcome of two strong but opposing forces: rising inequality and positive growth.

Table 6 also gives regressions including the change in inequality. It is unsurprising that this has a strong positive effect on poverty. (The regression can be viewed as a log–linear approximation of the underlying mathematical relationship between a poverty measure and the mean and the Lorenz curve on which that measure is based.) What is more interesting is that there is evidence of a strong time trend in the impact of inequality, as indicated by the positive interaction effect between time and the change in inequality. Poverty in China has become more responsive to inequality over this period. Indeed, the size of the interaction effect in Table 6 suggests that the elasticity of poverty to inequality was virtually zero around 1980, but the elasticity rose to 3.7 in 2001 for the headcount index and 5–6 for the poverty gap measures.

4.2. The pattern of growth

While China's economic growth has clearly played an important role in the country's long-term success against absolute poverty, the data suggest that the sectoral composition of growth has mattered.¹⁸ This can be seen clearly if we decompose the growth rates by income components. Consider first the urban–rural decomposition for the survey mean. The overall mean at date t is $\mu_t = n_t^r \mu_t^r + n_t^u \mu_t^u$ where μ_t^i is the mean for sector $i=r, u$ for rural and urban areas. It is readily verified that the growth rate in the overall mean can be written as:

$$\Delta \ln \mu_t = s_t^r \Delta \ln \mu_t^r + s_t^u \Delta \ln \mu_t^u + [s_t^r - s_t^u (n_t^r/n_t^u)] \Delta \ln n_t^r$$

where $s_t^i = n_t^i \mu_t^i / \mu_t$ (for $i=r, u$) is the income share. We can thus write down the following regression for testing whether the composition of growth matters:

$$\Delta \ln P_t = \eta_0 + \eta^r s_t^r \Delta \ln \mu_t^r + \eta^u s_t^u \Delta \ln \mu_t^u + \eta^n \left(s_t^r - s_t^u \frac{n_t^r}{n_t^u} \right) \Delta \ln n_t^r + \varepsilon_t \quad (2)$$

where ε_t is a white-noise error term. The motivation for writing the regression this way is evident when one notes that if the η^i ($i=r, u, n$) parameters are the same then Eq. (2) collapses to a simple regression of the rate of poverty reduction on the rate of growth ($\Delta \ln \mu_t$). Thus testing $H_0: \eta^i = \eta$ for all i tells us whether the urban–rural composition of growth matters. Note that this regression decomposition is based on somewhat different assumptions to that used in the analytic decomposition in Eq. (1) based on the assumption that urbanization follows a Kuznets process. In particular, any systematic within-sector distributional effects of urbanization would now change the measured contribution to poverty.

Table 7 gives the results for all three poverty measures. The null hypothesis that $\eta^i = \eta$ for all i is convincingly rejected in all three cases. Furthermore, we cannot reject the null that only the growth rate of rural incomes matters.

¹⁸ The literature has often emphasized the importance of the sectoral composition of growth to poverty reduction; for an overview of the arguments and evidence see Lipton and Ravallion (1995). The following analysis follows the methods introduced in Ravallion and Datt (1996), which found that the composition of growth mattered to poverty reduction in India.

Table 7
Poverty reduction and the rural, urban composition of growth

	Headcount index	Poverty gap index	Squared poverty gap index
Constant	0.033 (0.808)	0.040 (0.690)	0.039 (0.510)
Growth rate of mean	-2.563	-3.341	-3.722
Rural income (share-weighted) (η^r)	(-8.432)	(-7.768)	(-6.637)
Growth rate of mean	0.092	0.519	0.744
Urban income (share-weighted) (η^u)	(0.201)	(0.797)	(0.877)
Population shift effect (η^p)	0.735 (0.159)	2.189 (0.335)	3.941 (0.462)
R^2	0.823	0.796	0.739
D-W	2.671	2.653	2.661

A second decomposition is possible for GDP per capita which we can divide into n sources to estimate a test equation of the following form:

$$\Delta \ln P_t = \pi_0 + \sum_{i=1}^n \pi_i s_{it} \Delta \ln Y_{it} + \epsilon_t \quad (3)$$

where Y_{it} is GDP per capita from source i , $s_{it} = Y_{it}/Y_t$ is the source's share, and ϵ_t is a white-noise error term. In the special case in which $\pi_i = \pi$ for $i = 1, \dots, n$, Eq. (3) collapses to a simple regression of the rate of poverty reduction on the rate of GDP growth ($\Delta \ln Y_t$).

With only 21 observations over time there are limits on how far we can decompose GDP. We used a standard classification of its origins, namely "primary" (mainly agriculture), "secondary" (manufacturing and construction) and "tertiary" (services and trade). Fig. 2 shows how the shares of these sectors evolved over time. The primary sector's share fell from 30% in 1980 to 15% in 2001, though not monotonically. Almost all of this decline was made up for by an increase in the tertiary-sector share; the share of




Fig. 2. Shares of GDP by sector.

secondary sector has no overall trend, but has been rising in the 1990s. However, it should not be forgotten that these are highly aggregated GDP components; the near stationarity of the secondary sector share over the whole period reflects the net effect of both contracting and expanding manufacturing sub-sectors.

Table 8 gives the estimated test equations based on (3) for H and PG, while Table 9 gives the results for SPG (for which a slightly different specification is called for, as we will see). We find that the sectoral composition of growth matters to the rate of poverty reduction. The primary sector has far higher impact (by a factor of about four) than either the secondary or tertiary sectors. The impacts of the latter two sectors are similar (and we cannot reject the null that they have the same impact). For SPG we cannot reject the null that only the primary sector matters and Table 9 gives the restricted model for this case. Our finding that the sectoral composition of growth matters echoes the findings of Ravallion and Datt (1996) for India, though tertiary sector growth was relatively more important in India than we find for China.

These aggregate results do not tell us about the source of the poverty-reducing impact of primary sector growth. With a relatively equitable distribution of access to agricultural land and higher incidence and depth of poverty in rural areas it is plausible that agricultural growth will bring large gains to the poor. There is evidence for China that this may also involve external effects at the farm-household level. One important source of externalities in rural development is the composition of economic activity locally. In poor areas of southwest China, Ravallion (2005) finds that the composition of local economic activity has non-negligible impacts on consumption growth at the household level. There are significant positive effects of local economic activity in a given sector on income growth from that sector. And there are a number of significant cross-effects, notably from farming to certain non-farm activities. The sector that matters most as a generator of positive externalities turns out to be agriculture (Ravallion, 2005).

A natural counterfactual for measuring the contribution of the sectoral composition of growth is the rate of poverty reduction if all three sectors had grown at the same rate. We call this “balanced growth”. Then the sector shares of GDP in 1981 would have remained constant over time, with 32% of GDP originating in the primary sector. From Table 8, the expected rate of change in the headcount index, conditional on the overall GDP growth rate, would then have been $0.155 - 4.039\Delta \ln Y_t$ (where $4.039 = 0.32 \times 7.852 + 0.68 \times 2.245$, based on Table 8). For the same GDP growth rate, the mean rate of poverty reduction would then have been 16.3% per year, rather than 9.5%. Instead of 20 years to bring the headcount index down from 53% to 8% it would have taken about 10 years.

This calculation would be deceptive if the same overall growth rate would not have been possible with balanced growth. There may well be a trade off, arising from limited substitution possibilities in production and rigidities in some aggregate factor supplies; or the trade-off could stem from aggregate fiscal constraints facing the government in supplying key public infrastructure inputs to private production. It is suggestive in this respect that there is a correlation of -0.414 between the two growth components identified from Table 8, $s_{1t}\Delta \ln Y_{1t}$ and $s_{2t}\Delta \ln Y_{2t} + s_{3t}\Delta \ln Y_{3t}$. However, this correlation is only significant at the 6% level, and it is clear that there were sub-periods (1983–84, 1987–88 and 1994–96) in which both primary sector growth and combined growth in the

Table 8
Poverty reduction and the sectoral composition of growth: headcount index and poverty gap index

	1	2	3
<i>Headcount index (log difference)</i>			
Constant	0.116 (1.059)	0.163 (1.656)	0.155 (1.761)
Growth rate of GDP per capita	−2.595 (−2.162)		
Primary (π_1)		−8.067 (−3.969)	−7.852 (−4.092)
Secondary (π_2)		−1.751 (−1.214)	
Tertiary (π_3)		−3.082 (−1.239)	
Secondary+ Tertiary			−2.245 (−2.199)
R^2	0.207	0.431	0.423
D–W	1.553	1.725	1.768
Tests:			
$\pi_1 - \pi_2$		−6.317 (−3.231)	−5.607 (−3.140)
$\pi_2 - \pi_3$		1.331 (0.405)	
<i>Poverty gap index (log difference)</i>			
Constant	0.160 (1.140)	0.233 (1.856)	0.216 (1.955)
Growth rate of GDP per capita	−3.133 (2.104)		
Primary (π_1)		−11.251 (−3.87)	−10.827 (−4.07)
Secondary (π_2)		−1.651 (−0.90)	
Tertiary (π_3)		−4.271 (−1.41)	
Secondary+ Tertiary			−2.623 (−2.06)
R^2	0.173	0.456	0.439
D–W	1.538	1.721	1.772
Tests:			
$\pi_1 - \pi_2$		−9.600 (−3.388)	−8.204 (−3.29)
$\pi_2 - \pi_3$		2.620 (0.644)	

The dependent variable is the first difference over time in the log of the poverty measures based on new poverty lines. *t*-ratios corrected for heteroscedasticity in parentheses.

secondary and tertiary sectors were *both* above average. So these data do not offer strong support for the view that more balanced growth would have meant lower growth.

We have seen that growth accounts for a sizeable share of the variance in rates of poverty reduction. When measured by survey means, growth accounts for about half of the variance; when measured from the national accounts, it accounts for one fifth of the variance.

Table 9

Poverty reduction and the sectoral composition of growth: squared poverty gap index

	1	2	3	4
Constant	0.184 (1.059)	0.272 (1.852)	0.252 (1.900)	0.033 (0.463)
Growth rate of GDP per capita	-3.376 (1.845)			
Primary (π_1)		-13.257 (-3.670)	-12.753 (-3.762)	-10.648 (-3.300)
Secondary (π_2)		-1.609 (-0.763)		
Tertiary (π_3)		-4.728 (-1.486)		
Secondary+			-2.767	
Tertiary			(-1.88)	
R^2	0.151	0.466	0.448	0.344
D-W	1.517	1.754	1.765	1.721
Tests:				
$\pi_1 - \pi_2$		-11.648 (-3.599)	-9.986 (3.26)	
$\pi_2 - \pi_3$		3.119 (0.724)		

Note: The dependent variable is the first difference over time in the log of the SPG index; t -ratios corrected for heteroscedasticity in parentheses.

However, the share of variance explained is doubled when we allow for the sectoral composition of growth, with the primary sector emerging as far more important than the secondary or tertiary sectors (though again there may well be heterogeneity within these broad sectors).

5. Inequality and growth

The literature has provided numerous partial pictures of inequality in China, focusing on sub-periods (such as in Khan and Riskin, 1998, who used two surveys spanning 1988–1995; the longest we know of is for 1985–95, in Kanbur and Zhang, 1999) and/or selected provinces (such as Tsui, 1998) or between urban and rural areas (as studied by Yang, 1994). As we will see, these partial pictures can be deceptive. We begin by considering inequality between urban and rural sectors; then within sectors and in the aggregate. Finally we turn to the relationship between inequality and growth.

5.1. Inequality between urban and rural areas

Fig. 3 gives the ratio of the urban mean income to the rural mean. Without our adjustment for the cost-of-living difference, there is a significant positive trend in the ratio of urban to rural mean income. The regression coefficient of the ratio of means on time is 0.047, with a t -ratio of 3.12 (this is corrected for serial correlation in the error term). However, when using the COL-adjusted means the coefficient drops to 0.021 and is not




Fig. 3. Relative inequality between urban and rural China.

significantly different from zero at the 5% level ($t=1.79$). Notice that there are still some relatively long sub-period trends in which the ratio of the urban to the rural mean was rising, including the period 1986 to 1994. The ratio of means fell sharply in the mid-1990s, though re-bounding in the late 1990s.

There is a trend increase in *absolute* inequality between urban and rural areas. This is measured by the difference between the urban and rural means, as in Fig. 4. The trend in the absolute difference (again calculated as the regression coefficient on time) is 0.044 per year, with a t -ratio of 3.40 (again corrected for serial correlation in the error term). However, here too there were periods that went against the trend, including in the early 1980s and mid-1990s.




Fig. 4. Absolute inequality between urban and rural China.

5.2. Inequality within urban and rural areas

We find trend increases in inequality within both sectors, though rural inequality fell in the early 1980s and again in the mid-1990s (Table 10). In marked contrast to most developing countries, relative income inequality is higher in rural areas, though the rate of increase in inequality is higher in urban areas; it looks likely that the pattern in other developing countries will emerge in the future. Notice also that there appears to be a common factor in the changes in urban and rural inequality; there is a correlation of 0.69 between the first difference in the log rural Gini index and that in the log urban index. We will return to this point.

5.3. Overall inequality

In forming the national Gini index in Table 10 we have incorporated our urban–rural cost of living adjustment. The table also gives the unadjusted estimates (as found in past work). As one would expect, national inequality is higher than inequality within either urban or rural areas. And allowing for the higher cost-of-living in urban areas reduces measured inequality. By 2001, the COL adjustment brings the overall Gini index down by over five percentage points. While a trend increase in national inequality is evident

Table 10
Gini indices of income inequality

	Rural	Urban	National	
			Without adjustment for COL difference	With adjustment for COL difference
1980	24.99	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1981	24.73	18.46	30.95	27.98
1982	24.40	16.27	28.53	25.91
1983	25.73	16.59	28.28	26.02
1984	26.69	17.79	29.11	26.89
1985	26.80	17.06	28.95	26.45
1986	28.48	20.66	32.41	29.20
1987	28.53	20.20	32.38	28.90
1988	29.71	21.08	33.01	29.50
1989	30.96	24.21	35.15	31.78
1990	29.87	23.42	34.85	31.55
1991	31.32	23.21	37.06	33.10
1992	32.03	24.18	39.01	34.24
1993	33.70	27.18	41.95	36.74
1994	34.00	29.22	43.31	37.60
1995	33.98	28.27	41.50	36.53
1996	32.98	28.52	39.75	35.05
1997	33.12	29.35	39.78	35.00
1998	33.07	29.94	40.33	35.37
1999	33.91	29.71	41.61	36.37
2000	35.75	31.86	43.82	38.49
2001	36.48	32.32	44.73	39.45
2002	n.a.	32.65	n.a.	n.a.




Fig. 5. Income inequality in rural and urban areas and nationally.

(Fig. 5), the increase is not found in all sub-periods: inequality fell in the early 1980s and the mid-1990s.

The rise in absolute inequality is even more pronounced. Fig. 6 gives the absolute Gini index, in which income differences are normalized by a fixed mean (for which we use the 1990 national mean). (The absolute Gini is not bounded above by unity.) It is notable that while relative inequality is higher in rural areas than urban areas, this reverses for absolute inequality, which is higher in urban areas at all dates.

Rising inequality greatly dampened the impact of growth on poverty. On re-calculating our rural poverty measures for 2001 using the 2001 rural mean applied to the 1981 Lorenz curve, we find that the incidence of poverty in rural areas (by our upper line) would have fallen to 2.04% in 2001, instead of 12.5%. The rural PG would have fallen to 0.70%




Fig. 6. Absolute inequality.

(instead of 3.32%) while the SPG would have been 0.16 (instead of 1.21). Repeating the same calculations for urban areas, poverty would have virtually vanished. But even with the same urban poverty measures for 2001 (so letting inequality within urban areas rise as it actually did), without the rise in *rural* inequality the national incidence of poverty would have fallen to 1.5%.

This begs the question of whether the same growth rate would have been possible without higher inequality. If de-controlling China's economy put upward pressure on inequality then we would be underestimating the level of poverty in 2001 that would have been observed without the rise in inequality, because the lower inequality would have come with a lower mean.

Inequality has certainly risen over time, in line with mean income. The regression coefficient of the Gini index on GDP per capita has a *t*-ratio of 9.22 (a correlation coefficient of 0.90). But this correlation could well be spurious (in the Granger–Newbold sense); indeed, the Durbin–Watson statistic is 0.45, indicating strong residual auto-correlation. This is not surprising since both inequality and mean income have strong trends, though possibly associated with different causative factors.

A better test is to compare the growth rates with changes in inequality over time.¹⁹ Then it becomes far less clear that higher inequality has been the price of China's growth. The correlation between the growth rate of GDP and log difference in the Gini index is -0.05 . Now the regression coefficient has a *t*-ratio of only 0.22 (and a Durbin–Watson of 1.75). This test does not suggest that higher growth per se meant a steeper rise in inequality.

The same conclusion is reached if we divide the series into four sub-periods according to whether inequality was rising or falling, as in Table 11. If there was an aggregate growth–equity trade-off then we would expect to see higher growth in the period in which inequality was rising. This is not the case; indeed, the two periods with highest growth in household income per capita were when inequality was falling. No clear pattern emerges for GDP growth.

These calculations do not reveal any sign of a short-term trade off between growth and equity. Possibly these time periods are too short to capture the effect. Another test is to see whether the provinces that had higher growth rates saw higher increases in inequality; we return to that question in Section 7.

5.4. Inequality and the pattern of growth

What role has the sectoral composition of growth played in the evolution of inequality?²⁰ Repeating our test based on Eq. (2) but this time using changes in the log

¹⁹ There is no sign of serial correlation in the residuals from the regression of the first difference of log Gini on log GDP. So the (first-order) differenced specification is defensible.

²⁰ The literature on distribution and development has emphasized the importance of the sectoral composition of growth (see, for example, Lipton and Ravallion, 1995; Ravallion and Datt, 1996; Bourguignon and Morrison, 1998).

Table 11
Inequality and growth by sub-periods

	Inequality	Annualized log difference (%/year)		
		Gini index	Mean household income	GDP per capita
1. 1981–85	Falling	–1.12	8.87	8.80
2. 1986–94	Rising	2.81	3.10	7.99
3. 1995–98	Falling	–0.81	5.35	7.75
4. 1999–2001	Rising	2.71	4.47	6.61

Gini index as the dependent variable we find strong evidence that the evolution of the Gini index is correlated with the urban–rural composition of growth:

$$\Delta \ln G_t = 0.020_{(1.285)} - 0.511_{(-4.399)} s_t^r \Delta \ln \mu_t^r + 0.466_{(2.651)} s_t^u \Delta \ln \mu_t^u - 0.366_{(-0.208)} [s_t^r - s_t^u (n_t^r/n_t^u)] \Delta \ln n_t^r + \hat{\varepsilon}_t^G$$

$$R^2 = 0.622; n = 20 \quad (4)$$

There is no sign of a population shift effect on aggregate inequality and the rural and urban coefficients add up to about zero. The joint restrictions $\eta^r + \eta^u = 0$ and $\eta^u = 0$ (borrowing the notation of Eq. (2)) pass comfortably, giving the rate of change in inequality as an increasing function of the difference in (share-weighted) growth rates between urban and rural areas:

$$\Delta \ln G_t = 0.015_{(2.507)} + 0.499_{(5.405)} (s_t^u \Delta \ln \mu_t^u - s_t^r \Delta \ln \mu_t^r) + \hat{\varepsilon}_t^G$$

$$R^2 = 0.619; n = 20. \quad (5)$$

Looking instead at the components of GDP by origin, one finds that primary sector growth has been associated with lower inequality overall, while there is no correlation with growth in either the secondary or tertiary sectors (Table 12). It is also clear that an important channel through which primary sector growth has been inequality reducing is its effect on the urban–rural income disparity. There is a negative correlation between primary sector growth and the changes in the (log) ratio of urban to rural mean income; the correlation is strongest if one lags primary sector growth by one period, giving the following OLS regression for the log of the ratio of the urban mean (\bar{Y}_t^u) to the rural mean (\bar{Y}_t^r):

$$\Delta \ln (\bar{Y}_t^u / \bar{Y}_t^r) = 0.044_{(2.657)} - 0.969_{(-3.802)} \Delta \ln Y_{1t-1} + \hat{\varepsilon}_t^Y$$

$$R^2 = 0.437; n = 20. \quad (6)$$

Table 13 gives regressions of the log difference of the Gini index by urban and rural areas on the growth rates (log differences) of both rural and urban mean incomes. We find that higher rural incomes were inequality reducing nationally. This happened in three ways. Firstly, rural economic growth clearly reduced inequality between urban and rural areas; secondly it reduced inequality within rural areas; thirdly, rural economic growth also

Table 12
Inequality and GDP growth by origin

	1	2	3
Constant	−0.072 (0.429)	0.038 (1.278)	0.038 (3.598)
Growth rate of GDP per capita	0.012 (0.544)		
Primary (π_1)		−1.798 (2.244)	−1.755 (2.819)
Secondary (π_2)		0.170 (0.432)	
Tertiary (π_3)		−0.218 (−0.272)	
R^2	0.018	0.326	0.316
D–W	2.112	2.112	2.202
$\pi_1 - \pi_2$		−1.968 (2.263)	
$\pi_2 - \pi_3$		0.388 (0.381)	

The dependent variable is the first difference over time in the log of the Gini.

reduced inequality within *urban* areas. As in other developing countries, the fortunes of China's urban poor are likely to be linked to rural economic growth through migration, transfers and trade. These linkages can readily entail distributional effects of rural economic growth on urban areas, given that it is more likely to be the urban poor (rather than urban non-poor) who gain from rural economic growth (such as by reduced need for remittances back to rural areas). However, we also find a strong and roughly offsetting *lagged* growth effect in rural areas, suggesting that it is the positive (negative) shocks to rural incomes that reduce (increase) inequality. This could arise from a short-term effect of rural income changes on migration and remittances. Growth in urban incomes is inequality

Table 13
Urban and rural inequality and growth in mean urban and rural incomes

	Rural		Urban	
Constant	0.013 (0.880)	0.019 (2.005)	0.006 (0.386)	−0.016 (−0.853)
Growth rate in mean rural income	−0.476 (−3.206)		−1.430 (−5.808)	
Growth rate in mean rural income lagged	0.510 (4.322)		1.014 (4.635)	
Double-difference in rural growth rates		−0.504 (−5.878)		−1.187 (−4.502)
Growth rate in mean urban income	0.075 (0.830)		0.687 (3.305)	0.664 (2.693)
AR (1)	0.481 (2.208)	0.510 (2.554)		
D–W	0.491	0.478	0.690 1.741	0.588 1.292

increasing in the aggregate and within urban areas, but not rural areas. This echoes results of Ravallion and Datt (1996) for India.

What then is driving the co-movement of inequality between urban and rural areas? The answer appears to lie in the role of rural incomes. As we have seen, for both urban and rural areas, the first differences in the log Gini index are negatively correlated with rural income growth. The regression residuals for the changes in rural inequality in Table 13 show no significant correlation with those for urban inequality, indicating that rural economic growth is the key common factor.

6. Economy-wide policies and poverty

In principle, many policies could matter to the pattern of growth and (hence) rate of poverty reduction. Here we focus on those that have received most attention in the literature, namely agrarian reform, agricultural pricing, macroeconomic stabilization, public spending and openness to external trade.

6.1. Agrarian reform

The early 1980s saw high growth in primary sector output and rapid rural poverty reduction in the wake of de-collectivization and the privatization of land-use rights under the “household responsibility system”. (Agricultural land had previously been farmed by organized brigades, in which all members shared the output more-or-less equally.) Since this was a one-off event across the whole country, we cannot test its explanatory power. However, the literature has pointed to the importance of these reforms in stimulating rural economic growth at the early stages of China’s transition (Fan, 1991; Lin, 1992; Chow, 2002). And (as we have seen) rural economic growth was key to falling poverty in that period. It would not be unreasonable to presume that the agrarian reforms around 1980 accounted for the bulk of rural poverty reduction in the first half of the 1980s, which (as we have also seen) accounted for roughly three-quarters of the total decline in the national poverty rate over 1981–2001.

6.2. Agricultural pricing policies

Until recently, the government has operated a domestic foodgrain procurement policy by which farmers are obliged to sell fixed quotas to the government at prices that are typically below the local market price. For some farmers this is an infra-marginal tax, given that they produce more foodgrains than their assigned quota; for others it will affect production decisions at the margin. It has clearly been unpopular with farmers (see, for example, the survey of Kung, 1995 of Chinese farmers’ attitudes).

Reducing this tax by raising procurement prices appears to have stimulated primary sector GDP. We find a strong correlation between the growth rate of primary sector output and the real procurement price of foodgrains (nominal price deflated by the rural CPI); see Fig. 7. There is both a current and lagged effect; an OLS regression of the growth rate in




Fig. 7. Primary sector growth and foodgrain procurement prices.

primary sector GDP on the current and lagged rates of change in the real procurement price (PP) gives:

$$\Delta \ln Y_{1t} = 0.045 + 0.210 \Delta \ln PP_t + 0.315 \Delta \ln PP_{t-1} + \hat{\epsilon}_t$$

(5.937)
(2.152)
(3.154)

$$R^2 = 0.590; D - W = 2.60; n = 19. \tag{7}$$

It is not then surprising that we find a strong negative correlation between the changes in the government’s procurement price and changes in inequality; Fig. 8 plots the two series (lagging the procurement price change by one year); the simple correlation coefficient is -0.609 .




Fig. 8. Inequality and the procurement price of foodgrains.

Cutting this tax has been an effective short-term policy against poverty.²¹ The regression coefficient of $\Delta \ln H_t$ on $\Delta \ln PP_{t-1}$ is -1.060 (t -ratio = -3.043). The channel for this effect was clearly through agricultural incomes. (The regression coefficient changes little if one adds controls for secondary and tertiary sector growth.) The elasticities of national poverty to procurement price changes are even higher for the poverty gap indices; for PG the coefficient is -1.433 ($t = -2.929$) and for SPG it is -1.708 ($t = -3.134$).

6.3. Macroeconomic stabilization

There were two inflationary periods in China, 1988–89 and 1994–95. Poverty rose in the former period and fell in the latter. However, when one controls for procurement price changes we find an adverse effect of lagged changes in the rate of inflation for all three poverty measures; for the headcount index:

$$\Delta \ln H_t = -0.082 - 1.257 \Delta \ln PP_{t-1} + 1.249 \Delta^2 \ln CPI_{t-1} + \hat{\varepsilon}_t$$

(-3.058)
(-3.688)
(2.493)

$$R^2 = 0.491; D - W = 1.86; n = 19 \quad (8)$$

where CPI is the rural CPI. (The regression was similar for the other poverty measures.) The strong adverse effect of inflation echoes findings elsewhere.²² There are also strong (pro-poor) distributional effects of procurement and inflationary shocks as can be seen by the fact that both regressors in (8) remain significant if one controls for the log difference in overall mean income:

$$\Delta \ln H_t = 0.060 - 1.040 \Delta \ln PP_{t-1} + 0.882 \Delta^2 \ln CPI_{t-1} - 2.335 \Delta \ln \bar{Y}_t$$

(3.791)
(-8.049)
(4.651)
(-9.843)

$$- 0.739 \hat{\varepsilon}_{t-1} + \hat{\nu}_t$$

(-3.775)

$$R^2 = 0.907; D - W = 2.28; n = 18. \quad (9)$$

6.4. Government spending

Fiscal expansions tended to reduce poverty; when the change in log real public spending is added to Eq. (8), its coefficient is -0.737 ($t = -2.095$).²³ However, adding $\Delta \ln \bar{Y}_t$ rendered the public spending variable insignificant (the coefficient dropped to

²¹ This is only one of many taxes and transfers with bearing on income distribution in China. It would be of interest to see a complete accounting of the incidence of taxes and transfers. This does not appear to exist in the literature at the time of writing.

²² Including Easterly and Fischer (2001) and Dollar and Kraay (2002) both using cross-country data, and Datt and Ravallion (1998) using data for India.

²³ On including the current and lagged values separately the homogeneity restriction passed comfortably. The public spending data are from NBS (1996, 2003) and include all types of spending at both central and local levels. The rural CPI was used as the deflator.

0.063, $t=0.325$). We also tried two decompositions of public spending, namely agriculture and non-agriculture and central and local. We found no evidence that government spending on agriculture had any greater poverty reducing impact than other spending; this was tested by adding the (share-weighted) change in log real public spending on agriculture as an additional regressor. The share of spending on agriculture was generally low (around 6–7% until the mid-1990s, falling to 5% after that), so it may well be difficult to pick up its impact (even when share-weighted). However, there was a strong indication that spending by provincial and local governments was more effective in reducing poverty than spending by the center.²⁴ Indeed, we could not reject the null that central government spending had no impact, giving the model:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta \ln H_t = & 0.003 - 1.601 \Delta \ln PP_{t-1} + 1.064 \Delta^2 \ln CPI_{t-1} - 1.319 s_t^{\text{GL}} \Delta \ln GL_t \\ & (0.106) \quad (-6.201) \quad (2.889) \quad (-3.988) \\ & - 0.502 \hat{\varepsilon}_{t-1} + \hat{\nu}_t \\ & (-1.986) \end{aligned}$$

$$R^2 = 0.640; D - W = 1.681; n = 19 \quad (10)$$

where S_t^L is the share of local spending in total spending and GL_t is real local spending. (The results were similar without share-weighting; the coefficient on $\Delta \ln GL_t$ was -0.676 , $t=-2.494$.) Changes in log *central* government spending were insignificant when added to this regression (a regression coefficient of -0.100 with a t -ratio of -0.486 ; other coefficients were affected little). Here too, there is no sign of a distributional effect of public spending; if we add $S_t^L \Delta \ln GL_t$ to Eq. (9) (controlling for changes in the log mean) then its coefficient drops to -0.305 and is not significantly different from zero ($t=-1.271$). Public spending has reduced absolute poverty but statistically we can't reject the null that its effect has been roughly distribution-neutral.²⁵

6.5. External trade

It has been claimed that China's external trade reforms helped reduce poverty (World Bank, 2002; Dollar, 2004). However, the timing does not suggest that external trade expansion is a plausible candidate for explaining China's progress against poverty. Granted, trade reforms had started in the early 1980s as part of Deng Xiaoping's "Open-Door Policy"—mainly entailing favorable exchange rate and tax treatment for exporters and creation of the first special-economic zone, Shenzhen, near Hong Kong. (Internal trade was also progressively liberalized, though here we only consider external trade.) However, the bulk of the trade reforms did not occur in the early 1980s, when poverty was falling so rapidly, but were later, notably with the extension of the special-economic zone principle to the whole country (from 1986) and from the mid-1990s, in the lead up to China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO); Table 14 shows that mean tariff rates fell only slightly in the 1980s and non-tariff barriers actually increased. And some of the

²⁴ Local spending accounted for 65.3% of the total in 2001; in 1980 it accounted for 45.7%.

²⁵ Similarly, if we re-estimate (10) replacing the headcount index by the Gini index, we find that $\Delta \ln GL_t$ is highly insignificant while the other two variables remain significant.

Table 14
China's external trade openness

	Mean tariff rates (%)				Incidence of non-tariff barriers (%)			
	1980–83	1984–87	1988–90	1991–93	1980–83	1984–87	1988–90	1991–93
Primary	22.7	20.6	19.1	17.8	n.a.	19.7	58.9	40.7
Manufactured	36.6	33.2	34.3	37.1	n.a.	16.1	34.4	19.2
All products	31.9	29.2	29.2	30.6	n.a.	17.2	42.6	26.4

Source: Weighted averages from UNCTAD (1994).

trade policies of this early period were unlikely to have been good for either equity or efficiency.²⁶

Nor does the times series on trade volume (the ratio of exports and imports to GDP) suggest that trade was poverty reducing, at least in the short term; the correlation between changes in trade volume and changes in the log headcount index is 0.00! Nor are changes in trade volume—both current values and lagged up to two-years—significant when added to Eqs. (8), (9) or (10). Trade volume may well be endogenous in this test, though it is not clear that correcting for the bias would imply that it played a more important role against poverty. This would require that trade volume is positively correlated with the omitted variables. However, one would probably be more inclined to argue that trade volume is negatively correlated with the residuals; other (omitted) growth-promoting policies simultaneously increased trade and reduced (absolute) poverty.

Other evidence, using different data and methods, also suggests that trade reform had had relatively little impact on poverty or inequality. [Chen and Ravallion \(2004\)](#) studied the household level impacts of the tariff changes from 1995 onwards (in the lead up to accession to the WTO). (The induced price and wage changes were estimated by [Ianchovichina and Martin, 2004](#), using a CGE model.) There was a positive impact of these trade reforms on mean household income, but virtually no change in aggregate inequality and only slightly lower aggregate poverty. Possibly longer-term impacts will be more positive (such as through growth-promoting access to new technologies and knowledge).

7. Poverty at provincial level

So far we have focused solely on the national time series. We now turn to the less complete data available at province level. We focus on rural poverty; urban poverty incidence is so low in a number of provinces that it becomes hard to measure and explain trends.

²⁶ For example, a two-tier price system allowed exporters to purchase commodities at a low planning price and then export them at a profit. For this reason, oil was a huge export item until 1986.

The series on mean rural incomes from NBS is complete from 1980. However, there are only 11–12 years of provincial distributions available. Table 15 gives summary statistics on the “initial” values of the mean, poverty and inequality. For the mean, the first

Table 15
Summary statistics for rural areas by province

Provinces by regional groupings (official codes)		Mean in 1980 (1980 prices)	Distributional data					
			No. years	First year	Value at first year of series			
<i>H</i> (%)	PG (%)	SPG (×100)			Gini index (%)			
<i>North</i>								
11	Beijing	290.46	10*	1988	0.35	0.14	0.13	24.84
12	Tianjin	277.92	12	1983	3.44	0.65	0.24	23.23
13	Hebei	175.78	12	1983	40.30	10.82	4.22	23.89
14	Shanxi	155.78	12	1983	30.04	7.61	2.75	27.48
15	Inner Mongolia	181.32	12	1983	42.51	10.96	4.07	26.01
<i>Northeast</i>								
21	Liaoning	273.02	11	1988	21.69	6.19	2.48	30.94
22	Jilin	236.30	12	1983	16.79	3.49	1.18	25.90
23	Heilongjian	205.38	11	1988	31.81	9.71	4.24	30.12
<i>East</i>								
31	Shanghai	397.35	12	1983	0.77	0.18	0.09	19.82
32	Jiangsu	217.94	12	1983	19.51	3.90	1.14	20.83
33	Zhejiang	219.18	12	1983	28.04	6.02	1.89	21.33
34	Anhui	184.82	12	1983	25.75	5.13	1.51	19.39
35	Fujian	171.74	11	1988	35.46	7.87	2.49	21.53
36	Jiangxi	180.94	12	1983	30.08	5.39	1.41	17.88
37	Shandong	194.33	12	1983	33.21	6.96	2.03	23.57
<i>Central</i>								
41	Henan	160.78	12	1983	55.58	14.46	5.30	21.47
42	Hubei	169.88	12	1983	24.08	4.45	1.18	20.30
43	Hunan	219.71	12	1983	7.58	0.90	0.19	18.72
44	Guangdong	274.37	11	1988	21.69	4.35	1.29	31.22
45	Guangxi	173.68	12	1983	54.08	14.63	5.53	24.81
46	Hainan	n.a.,	10	1990	50.08	15.52	6.79	28.89
<i>Southwest</i>								
51	Sichuan	187.90	12	1983	40.59	8.32	2.50	19.33
52	Guizhou	161.46	11	1988	34.85	7.83	2.64	23.42
53	Yunnan	150.12	12	1983	34.20	6.84	1.91	22.73
<i>Northwest</i>								
61	Sha'anxi	142.49	12	1983	27.35	5.52	1.63	19.83
62	Gansu	153.33	12	1983	39.34	9.55	3.21	26.18
63	Qinghai	156.10**	11	1988	23.42	6.09	2.38	32.93
64	Ningxia	198.45	12	1983	22.08	5.32	1.81	25.25
65	Xinjiang	232.10	11	1988	22.84	6.23	2.32	33.10

*1990 missing; **1981.

observation is for 1980; for the distributional measures the first available year is 1983 in two-thirds of cases and 1988 for almost all the rest. There are marked differences in starting conditions. Even for inequality, the Gini index around the mid 1980s varied from 18% to 33% (Table 15).

Table 16 gives the trends based on the OLS estimates of $\log X_{it} = \alpha_i^X + \beta_i^X t + v_{it}^X$ for variable X at date t in province i . We assume an AR(1) error term for mean income. However, for the (incomplete, discontinuous) distributional data we have little practical choice but to treat the error term as white noise. Trend growth rates in mean incomes vary from 1% per year (in Xinjiang) to almost 7% per year (in Anhui). Trends in the Gini index vary from near zero (Guangdong) to 3% (Beijing). Guangdong had an astonishing trend rate of decline in H of 29% per year. At the other extreme there are six provinces for which the trend was not significantly different from zero, namely Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Yunnan, Ningxia, Xinjiang, though the first three of these started the period with very low poverty rates (Table 15).

The literature has pointed to divergence between the coastal and inland provinces.²⁷ This has been linked to the government's regional policies, which have favored coastal provinces through differential tax treatment and public investment. We confirm expectations that coastal provinces had significantly higher trend rates of poverty reduction.²⁸ The mean trend rate of decline in the headcount index was 8.43% per year for inland provinces ($t=4.14$) versus 16.55% for the coastal provinces ($t=5.02$); the t -statistic for the difference in trends is 2.10.

7.1. Poverty and growth at the provincial level

The association between rural income growth and poverty reduction is confirmed in the provincial data. Fig. 9 plots the trend rate of change in the headcount index against the trend rate of growth in mean rural income across provinces. The figure also identifies the three observations with lowest initial poverty measures, for which there was also an increase (though statistically insignificant) in poverty over time, namely Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin.

The regression coefficient of the trend in the headcount index on the trend in rural income is -1.58 , which is significant at the 5% level ($t=-2.05$). The 95% confidence interval for the impact of a 3% growth rate on the headcount index is about (0%, 9%). However, if one drops Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin then the relationship is steeper and more precisely estimated. The regression coefficient is then -2.43 ($t=4.29$). The 95% confidence interval for the poverty impact of a 3% growth rate is then about (4%, 10%).

While higher growth meant a steeper decline in poverty, we see in Fig. 9 considerable dispersion in the impact of a given rate of growth on poverty. This is also evident if we calculate the “growth elasticity of poverty reduction” as the ratio of the trend in the

²⁷ See Chen and Fleisher (1996), Jian et al. (1996), Sun and Dutta (1997), and Raiser (1998).

²⁸ The coastal provinces are Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong and Guangdong; following convention, we do not classify Guangxi as “coastal” though it has a coastal area.

Table 16
Trends for rural areas by province

	Mean (1980–2001)	Gini index	Head-count index	Poverty gap index	Squared poverty gap index
Beijing	3.51 (3.75)	3.01 (3.28)	3.46 (0.95)	1.81 (0.38)	0.12 (0.02)
Tianjin	5.75 (4.09)	1.73 (4.24)	0.94 (0.18)	2.94 (0.49)	0.94 (0.13)
Hebei	3.36 (2.95)	0.70 (1.39)	–14.11 (5.97)	–14.21 (5.09)	–14.30 (4.51)
Shanxi	4.16 (7.6)	1.07 (3.47)	–8.26 (3.98)	–7.23 (2.74)	–5.76 (1.74)
Inner Mongolia	3.94 (6.65)	1.77 (3.21)	–8.03 (4.01)	–6.76 (2.08)	–4.96 (1.07)
Liaoning	3.34 (3.5)	1.53 (2.48)	–7.19 (2.39)	–4.22 (1.02)	–0.58 (0.12)
Jilin	4.39 (–6.05)	1.28 (3.00)	–5.36 (2.19)	–1.90 (0.56)	1.35 (0.29)
Heilongjian	3.24 (6.24)	1.45 (3.86)	–6.78 (3.96)	–4.40 (1.89)	0.86 (0.22)
Shanghai	5.43 (6.44)	2.07 (2.27)	2.24 (0.38)	3.79 (0.46)	3.04 (0.36)
Jiangsu	6.01 (15.98)	1.65 (3.21)	–20.02 (5.64)	–18.29 (5.04)	–14.35 (3.76)
Zhejiang	2.74 (2.78)	1.92 (4.24)	–11.68 (9.38)	–12.61 (6.35)	–13.34 (4.02)
Anhui	6.66 (19.74)	0.87 (2.19)	–14.36 (4.60)	–14.81 (4.03)	–13.01 (3.07)
Fujian	4.40 (11.29)	2.35 (4.03)	–22.06 (5.13)	–23.38 (6.25)	–22.87 (9.81)
Jiangxi	4.48 (4.96)	2.40 (5.79)	–12.29 (5.08)	–9.90 (3.42)	–5.83 (1.71)
Shandong	5.50 (8.17)	1.25 (3.75)	–12.74 (6.38)	–13.41 (5.66)	–12.32 (3.45)
Henan	3.09 (3.49)	1.04 (2.26)	–16.10 (7.49)	–18.47 (6.80)	–19.27 (5.72)
Hubei	2.64 (3.71)	1.87 (9.67)	–13.32 (7.36)	–12.57 (5.84)	–9.76 (4.60)
Hunan	5.21 (12.96)	1.99 (9.19)	–6.90 (3.20)	–4.01 (1.56)	–0.87 (0.22)
Guangdong	4.32 (16.28)	–0.36 (1.00)	–28.58 (12.29)	–26.46 (9.51)	–21.74 (5.88)
Guangxi	5.75 (9.42)	0.45 (1.13)	–11.54 (4.82)	–13.24 (4.14)	–14.41 (3.86)
Hainan	5.39* (20.46)	2.12 (4.75)	–10.03 (7.60)	–12.26 (5.88)	–13.47 (4.75)
Sichuan	3.58 (7.08)	1.76 (5.81)	–11.03 (6.51)	–10.36 (5.23)	–8.17 (4.02)
Guizhou	2.06 (5.38)	1.05 (3.47)	–6.49 (4.98)	–7.76 (3.66)	–8.35 (2.85)
Yunnan	1.09 (1.86)	2.55 (21.00)	–0.61 (0.79)	1.39 (1.26)	3.61 (2.64)

Table 16 (continued)

	Mean (1980–2001)	Gini index	Head-count index	Poverty gap index	Squared poverty gap index
Sha'anxi	2.43 (6.56)	2.41 (6.47)	−3.43 (3.74)	−2.48 (1.85)	−1.32 (0.74)
Gansu	3.66 (5.53)	1.75 (5.51)	−6.65 (4.89)	−7.35 (3.47)	−7.95 (2.76)
Qinghai	2.08 (3.00)	1.46 (1.60)	−4.72 (2.06)	−2.98 (0.89)	−1.18 (0.27)
Ningxia	2.85 (2.44)	2.06 (4.84)	−2.94 (1.72)	−3.27 (1.04)	−3.44 (0.75)
Xinjiang	0.97 (1.66)	1.39 (4.72)	0.37 (0.25)	1.62 (0.68)	3.21 (0.97)
Rural China	3.36 (4.15)	1.72 (12.73)	−5.66 (−6.10)	−5.39 (−4.36)	−5.21 (−3.33)

22 annual observations 1980–2001 for provincial means except * series which starts in 1990; 10–12 unevenly spaced observations for distributional data. All trends for the mean incorporate an AR(1) error term, while trends for the distributional data are based on OLS regressions.

headcount index to the trend in the mean. This varies from −6.6 to 1.0, with a mean of −2.3.

What explains these diverse impacts of a given rate of growth on poverty? If inequality did not change then the elasticity will depend on the parameters of the initial distribution, roughly interpretable as the mean and “inequality.” More generally, with changing distribution, the elasticity will also depend on the trend in inequality. On imposing data consistent parameter restrictions, the following regression is easily interpreted:²⁹

$$\beta_i^H / \beta_i^Y = \left(\begin{array}{c} -5.935 \\ (-4.487) \end{array} + \begin{array}{c} 0.0136 \\ (2.560) \end{array} \bar{y}_{80i}^R \right) (1 - G_{83i}^R) + \begin{array}{c} 1.365 \\ (2.392) \end{array} \beta_i^G + \hat{\epsilon}_t$$

$$R^2 = 0.386; n = 29 \quad (11)$$

where \bar{y}_{80i}^R is the initial mean for province i less the national mean. At zero trend in inequality and the mean residual, the elasticity is zero at $G_{83}^R=1$ and becomes more negative in provinces with lower initial inequality. At $G_{83}^R=0$, the elasticity at mean income is −6, but goes toward zero as income rises. So a given rate of growth had more poverty-reducing impact in initially less unequal and poorer provinces.

Echoing our results using the national time series data, we find no evidence of a growth–equity trade off in the provincial data. Fig. 10 plots the trends in the Gini index against the trend in the mean; the correlation coefficient is −0.188. We do not

²⁹ Starting from an unrestricted regression of β^H / β^M on $G_{83}^R, \bar{y}^R, G_{83}^R \cdot \bar{y}^R$ and β^G a joint F -test does not reject the null hypothesis (with prob.=0.17) that the joint restrictions hold that are needed to obtain (11) as the restricted form.




Fig. 9. Trend rate of change in rural poverty against trend growth rate in mean rural income across 29 provinces.

see any sign that higher growth put more upward pressure on inequality. With no evidence of an aggregate trade-off, we are drawn to conclude that rising inequality over time put a brake on the rate of poverty reduction at provincial level. Provinces in which inequality rose less tended to have *higher* rates of poverty reduction (Fig. 11); the correlation coefficient is 0.517 ($t=3.14$).

A simple measure of the cost to the poor of rising inequality can be obtained by projecting the poverty measure in 2001 that one would have expected if the growth process had been distribution neutral, such that all levels of income grew at the same rate. Fig. 12 compares this simulated poverty measure for rural areas in 2001 with the actual




Fig. 10. Trend in rural Gini index against trend in mean income.




Fig. 11. Trend in headcount index against trend in Gini index.

values.³⁰ The distributional shifts were poverty increasing; indeed, in 23 provinces the poverty rate in 2001 was more than three times higher than one would have expected without the rise in inequality.

One province stands out as an exception to this pattern of rising inequality, namely Guangdong (the hinterland of Hong Kong). Because inequality showed no upward trend, Guangdong was able to achieve the highest rate of poverty reduction with only a slightly above average rate of growth and despite relatively high initial inequality (Table 15).

How pro-poor was the geographic pattern of growth? This can be assessed by seeing whether there was higher growth in the provinces where growth had more impact on poverty nationally. Fig. 13 gives the scatter plot of growth rates against the total elasticities (ratio of trend in H to trend in mean) weighted by the 1981 shares of total poverty. (The weights assure that this gives the impact on national poverty of growth in a given province.) It is plain that growth has not been any higher in the provinces in which it would have had the most impact on poverty nationally. This also echoes findings for India in the 1990s (Datt and Ravallion, 2002).

7.2. Explaining the provincial trends

It is instructive to see how much of the inter-provincial variance in trend rates of poverty reduction is explicable in terms of two sets of variables: (i) *initial conditions* related to mean incomes and their distribution, and (ii) *location*, notably whether the province is coastal or not (COAST). Guangdong is treated as a special case. In accounting for initial distribution, we include both the initial Gini index of rural incomes (G_{83}^R) and

³⁰ The simulated poverty measure was obtained using the initial Lorenz curve and the 2001 mean.




Fig. 12. Actual poverty in 2001 and simulated level without the rise inequality.

the initial ratio of urban mean income to rural mean (UR).³¹ We postulate that these variables mattered to both the rate of growth and the growth elasticity of poverty reduction. Combining these variables, we obtain the following regression for the trend rate of change in the headcount index:³²

$$\beta_i^H = -67.877 + 0.141 \bar{Y}_{80i} + 0.463 G_{83i}^R + 6.797 UR_i - 9.291 COAST_i - 25.012 GDONG_i + \hat{\epsilon}_i$$

(-6.239)
(8.090)
(3.313)
(3.201)
(-5.292)
(-15.160)

$$R^2 = 0.827; n = 28. \tag{12}$$

Initially poorer (in terms of mean income) and less unequal provinces (by both measures) had higher subsequent rates of poverty reduction. The effects are large; going from the lowest initial inequality to the highest cuts 7% points off the annual rate of poverty reduction. Controlling for the initial mean and distributional variables, being on the coast increased the trend rate of poverty reduction by 9% points; being in Guangdong raised it by (a massive) 25% points.

There are two ways in which initial inequality mattered. One is through growth; less unequal provinces had higher growth rates, consistent with a body of theory and

³¹ This is defined as the ratio of urban mean in 1985 (the first available data point from the UHS) and the first available rural mean (in two-thirds of the cases 1983).

³² Note that a higher value of the dependent variable means that there was less poverty reduction. We also tried re-running this regression only using the 20 provinces for which the first year is 1983. The initial Gini index and the urban–rural income differential remained highly significant.




Fig. 13. Growth did not occur where it would have most impact on poverty.

evidence.³³ This can be seen if we switch to the trend in mean rural income as the dependent variable for Eq. (11), giving:

$$\beta_i^Y = 14.143 - 0.007 \bar{Y}_{80i} - 0.149 G_{83i}^R - 1.632 UR_i + 0.507 COAST_i + 1.290 GDONG_i + \hat{\varepsilon}_i$$

(3.759) (-1.294) (-2.526) (-2.682) (0.913)
(1.875)

$$R^2 = 0.423; n = 28 \tag{13}$$

Surprisingly, the dummy variables for coastal provinces and Guangdong are insignificant in the growth regression; their effect on poverty appears to be largely distributional.

Secondly, initial distribution matters independently of growth, as we saw in Eq. (11). This is consistent with the fact that if one adds the trend rate of growth to Eq. (12) then both inequality measures remain significant, although the coefficients drop in size (by about one third) and the initial Gini index is only significant at the 10% level (the urban rural differential remains significant). Growth has less impact on poverty in more unequal provinces, consistent with cross-country evidence (Ravallion, 1997).

8. Conclusions

China's success against poverty since the reforms that began in 1978 is undeniable. But a closer inspection of the numbers holds some warnings for the future and some caveats on the implications for fighting poverty in the rest of the developing world.

³³ For evidence on this point at county level for China see Ravallion (1998) and at village level see Benjamin et al. (2004); on the theory and evidence see Aghion et al. (1999) and Bardhan et al. (1999).

The specifics of the situation in China at the outset of the reform period should not be forgotten in attempting to draw implications for other developing countries. The Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution had left a legacy of pervasive and severe rural poverty by the mid-1970s. Yet much of the rural population that had been forced into collective farming (with weak incentives for work) could still remember how to farm individually. So there were some relatively easy gains to be had by undoing these failed policies—by de-collectivizing agriculture and shifting the responsibility for farming to households. This brought huge gains to the country's (and the world's) poorest. Though we cannot offer a rigorous test against alternative explanations, we would hypothesize that the halving of the national poverty rate in the first few years of the 1980s was largely attributable to picking these “low-lying fruits” of agrarian reform. But this was a one-time reform.

An obvious, though nonetheless important, lesson for other developing countries that is well illustrated by China's experience is the need for governments to do less harm to poor people, by reducing the (explicit and implicit) taxes they face. In China's case, the government has until recently operated an extensive foodgrain procurement system that effectively taxed farmers by setting quotas and fixing procurement prices below market levels. This gave the Chinese government a powerful anti-poverty lever in the short-term, by raising the procurement price—as what happened in the mid-1990s, bringing both poverty and inequality down.

When so much of a country's poverty is found in its rural areas, it is not surprising that agricultural growth plays an important role in poverty reduction. China's experience is consistent with the view that agriculture and rural development are crucial to pro-poor growth in most low-income developing countries. However, here too the past efficacy of agricultural growth in reducing poverty in China reflects (at least in part) an unusual historical circumstance, namely the relatively equitable land allocation that could be achieved at the time of breaking up the collectives.

Macroeconomic stability (notably by avoiding inflationary shocks) has also been good for poverty reduction. The adverse impacts on poor people of inflationary shocks probably stemmed from short-term stickiness in some of the key factor and output prices determining their real incomes. Government spending was also poverty reducing, though much more so for spending by provincial and local governments than spending by the central government and public spending as a whole was not inequality-reducing. The score card for trade reform is less clear. While the country's success in trade reform may well bring longer term gains to the poor the experience of 1981–2001 does not provide support for the view that China's periods of expanding external trade brought more rapid poverty reduction.

Looking ahead, this study points to some reasons to suspect that it will be more difficult for China to maintain its past rate of progress against poverty without addressing the problem of rising inequality. To the extent that recent history is any guide to the future, we can expect that the historically high levels of inequality found in many provinces today will inhibit future prospects for poverty reduction—just as we have seen how the provinces that started the reform period with (relatively) high inequality had a harder time reducing poverty. At the same time, it appears that aggregate growth is increasingly coming from sources that bring fewer gains to the poorest. Arguably, the low-lying fruits

of efficiency-enhancing pro-poor reforms are getting scarce. Inequality is continuing to rise *and* poverty is becoming much more responsive to rising inequality.

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Appendix A. Adjustments for the change in valuation methods in 1990

The change in valuation methods is clearly not a serious concern for the early 1980s when foodgrain markets had not yet been liberalized (Guo, 1992; Chow, 2002). Since virtually all foodgrain output was sold to the government, it would have been appropriate to value consumption from own-production at the government's procurement price. However, with the steps toward liberalization of foodgrain markets starting in 1985, a discrepancy emerged between procurement and market prices, with planning prices for foodgrain being substantially lower than market prices in the late 1980s (Chen and Ravallion, 1996).

The change in the methods of valuation for income-in-kind in 1990 (whereby planning prices were replaced by local selling prices) creates a problem in constructing a consistent series of poverty measures for China. Table A1 gives our calculations of the key summary statistics by both methods using the *rural* data for 1990 provided by NBS. This entailed about a 10% upward revision to NBS estimates of mean rural income and a downward revision to inequality estimates. On both counts, measured poverty fell, as can be seen by comparing the first two rows of numbers in Table A1.

To address this problem in the data for the late 1980s, we calibrated a simple "correction model" to the data for 1990. Note first that the data from the tabulations provided by NBS do not come in equal-sized fractiles. So we must first "harmonize" the data for the old and new prices. To do this we estimated parametric Lorenz curves for each distribution separately and used these to estimate the mean income of all those below each of 100 percentiles of the distribution ranked by income per person. Having lined up the distributions in common factiles, we estimated a flexible parametric model of the log ratio of mean income at new prices to that at the old prices. A cubic function of the percentile gave an excellent fit to the data, in the form of the following regression for the ratio of

Table A1
Performance of our adjustment method for rural China 1990

	Mean income (Yuan per person)	Gini index (%)	Headcount index (%)	Poverty gap index (%)	Squared poverty gap index (%)
Old valuation method	629.70	31.53	37.63	11.13	4.55
New method: actual	686.30	29.87	29.93	7.85	2.87
New method: estimated using our correction model	688.05	30.05	29.86	7.86	2.88

income valued at the new prices ($Y(\text{new})$) to that at the old prices ($Y(\text{old})$) (t -ratios in parentheses):

$$Y(\text{new})/Y(\text{old}) = 1.19272 - 0.20915p + 0.23457p^2 - 0.12562p^3 + \hat{\epsilon}$$

(5421.5)
(-111.8)
(54.5)
(-44.9)

$$R^2 = 0.99959 \tag{A1}$$

where p =cumulative proportion of the population ranked by income per person (i.e., $0 < p < 1$). On using this regression to estimate the distribution of income in 1990 at the new prices from that based on the old prices we obtained the estimates in the last row of Table A1. It can be seen that the estimates of summary statistics and poverty measures for the new prices accord quite closely to those obtained from the data directly.

We applied this method to estimate a corrected “as if new prices” series for the 1980s. However, since we know that foodgrain prices (as with most other consumer goods) were not freed up until 1985 we only applied this correction method to the “old price” series from 1985 onwards. It is also unlikely that this change happened overnight, so we smooth the transition in data. We do this by replacing the old price series by a weighted mean of the old price series and our estimates of what we would have obtained using new prices. The weight on the estimated new price series rises linearly over time from 0.2 in 1985 to




Fig. A1. Effect on headcount index of correction for the change in valuation methods.




Fig. A2. Effect on Gini index and mean of our corrections.

1.0 in 1989. This is admittedly ad hoc, but it seems the most defensible approach with the information available.

Fig. A1 shows the effect of our correction method on the time series of headcount indices of rural poverty. Fig. A2 shows the effect on the mean and Gini index.

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