by Giorgio Strafella.

Sometimes one is so dazzled by China’s economic performance that one forgets how important ideas and ideology are for the CCP’s claim to legitimacy. While managerial merit is often invoked by the party’s eulogists, party leaders rely more on ideas than performance when arguing that they constitute the best possible ruling elite. Furthermore, the emphasis placed on a monistic ideology that is assumedly true and exhaustive, and on their infallibility as interpreters of said ideology (see my previous post), makes China’s party-state resemble what Piekalkiewicz and Penn called “ideocracy.”

Only some in society possess the hermeneutic art and authority to elaborate on this ideology. Beside from political leaders themselves, this elite only includes intellectuals. This is why, despite the political and economic “marginalisation” they have experienced since 1989, intellectuals still matter in Chinese politics — the CCP itself was originally a party of philosophers and literati.If the rise and fall of Bo Xilai has political implications that the career-ending scandals of Chen Xitong, Chen Liangyu and Liu Zhijun lacked, it is also because Bo’s spectacular claim to possess a superior and more faithful interpretation of Marxism-for-China within the ideocratic context of the party-state.

Based on my conversations with Chinese intellectuals during the unfolding of the scandal (April-May 2012), it appears that during his years at Chongqing and especially shortly before his downfall, Bo eagerly searched the support of prominent scholars and public intellectuals. Rumours circulated that Bo even paid a few of them to skew public opinion in his favour. Some well-established scholars close to the “New Left” (NL) accepted positions at Chongqing University — a move widely interpreted as an endorsement of the “Chongqing Model.” Explicitly endorsing a politician represents a dangerous gambit for an intellectual in China, as the sorry fate of the “democratic elite” associated with Zhao Ziyang in the 1980s taught us. For NL intellectuals, Bo Xilai represented an alternative to “market capitalism” and economic inequality, but also — and for some at least, especially — the promise of a new state-enforced, intellectual-designed, ethico-political hegemonic ideology for a “spiritual renaissance” of Chinese society.

As a consequence, the implications of the scandal extend into the realm of intellectual politics and factionalism. The rumours about alleged crimes by Bo and Gu Kailai became a source of embarrassment for the NL, as liberals accused their opponents of supporting a degenerate clan. In the habitual overlapping of individual morals and political ideas, an alleged murder became an indictment of the NL’s rejection of (Neo)Liberism and Westernisation. At the same time, NL intellectuals want to save the value of their search for a new development model from the downfall of their patron/hero, stressing how the country still needs to formulate its original and sustainable path toward social justice and societal harmony.

The scandal marks a turning point in contemporaneous intellectual politics not only because of its polarising effects on the debate. It also highlights a disturbing fact — the lingering of a servile attitude among intellectuals vis-à-vis power holders. This may surprise, as some of those NL intellectuals rejected such a role during the so-called “debate on the spirit of the humanities” in the 1990s. Whether their recent move was due to career calculations, or to the Confucian dream of entering the royal court to enlighten the king, it nonetheless reveals the inability to finally abandon any elitism and engage directly with society (minjian) on an equal level, as some of their colleagues in the social sciences already do.

Giorgio Strafella is a PhD Candidate of School of Contemporary Chinese Studies.

Opinions expressed in the CPI blog do not represent the views of the China Policy Institute or the School of Contemporary Chinese Studies at the University of Nottingham. They are the personal views of the bloggers/authors.

Comments

  1. A fascinating blog, Giorgio. In your conclusion you critique the “lingering of a servile attitude among intellectuals vis-à-vis power holders” and the “inability to finally abandon any elitism and engage directly with society (minjian) on an equal level, as some of their colleagues in the social sciences already do”. I fully agree with your finding. A number of renowned Chinese social scientists have indeed left the ivory tower of academia. According to my observations they tend to engage with society with the help of Chinese civil society organisations. Activists scholar Yang Tuan from the Chinese Academy for Social Sciences springs to my mind. Professor Yang not only conducts research on Chinese civil society organisations but also advises many of them. Professor Gu Jun from Shanghai University has also long been working both with local governments all over China as well as with Beijing-based non-profit organisation Shining Stone Community Action. Finally, Professor Zhu Jiangang from Sun Yat-sen University has been instrumental in building up capacities for civil society groups in southern China. These three academics, Professor Yang, Professor Gu and Professor Zhu, are indicative of the gradually changing roles of Chinese intellectuals. They take on greater social and political responsibilities by exercising citizenship. I would be interested to hear about other examples of Chinese public intellectuals who adopt a non-elitist approach to society.

    1. The more I think about this, the more I feel that looking at actual scholar-civil society interaction is more interesting than empty intellectual-ish talking about “models” and “theories.” I would like to focus in the future more on voices that offer original visions and approaches, and less on the usual anti-westernisation/pro-westernisation, state-capacity/private sector rants.

  2. A fascinating piece… I wish we could learn more on these academic appointments at Chongqing University. Has anyone tried to draw parallels between partification and the penetration of colleges by local politics today and during the Nanjing decade?

  3. Appointments at Chongqing University’s Institute for Advanced Studies in Humanities and Social Sciences since July 2011: http://ias.cqu.edu.cn/chinese/index.aspx# Note: Cui Zhiyuan (Tsinghua), Zhang Xudong (New York), Gan Yang (Zhongshan), Liu Xiaofeng (Renda), Wang Zhaoguang (Peking), Wang Xiaoming (Shanghai), Cai Xiang (Shanghai), Luo Gang (ECNU), Zhou Yongming (Wisconsin-Madison). My reflections above do NOT equally refer to all of them.

    1. http://www.guancha.cn/html2/60317/2011/10/10/65876.shtml. Those of you who read China Perspectives may have already seen this.

      Xudong Zhang (Phd, Duke), Chair of East Asian Studies at New York University and since 2011, Dean of the IAS at Chongqing University:

      “关键是,1980年代的学人具有一种总体性的思考方式,他们关心方方面面的问题,从总体去把握现实,从总体上去求知,不会去想做具体某一个方面的专家,不会想到去向西方人学习中国的东西。他们的求知欲也是整体。现在国内的国宝级大师在80年代也是刚经历磨难,百废待兴,学问上不足以镇住我们。那时候我们都带着这种总体性视野冲西学而去,除非有特殊原因,都不会选择去美国读东亚系、汉学系,除非是为了去名校——给你个哈佛的名头,你去不去?”

      “仅仅从经济发展和人民安居乐业来证明国家的合法性是不够的,比安居乐业你能比得过美国吗?价值话语要有人考虑。共产党提出“和谐社会”也是出于这样的考虑。但是现在学界很多价值说辞太接近于政府实用主义的政策。这个民族还没有很多的精力来系统深入地考虑我们的生存根据,考虑我们与他人的关系。我们的四周全是敌人——南海问题只是一个缩影。这是我们的老祖宗从来没有面对过的问题。”

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