Written by Derek Ye Xiao Di.

U.S. President Donald Trump concluded his Asia-Pacific trip a few weeks ago, but its outcome is still being questioned. Trump’s meeting in Beijing with President Xi Jinping was by far the most important engagement given China plays an inceasingly direct competitor to the United States.

From the perspective of Taipei, the importance of the Xi-Trump meeting lay in the potential effects of both powers policy towards the disputed island.  Taiwan however was not the primary emphasis of the bilateral held this month—the issue having already been addressed during Trump’s transition period. Thus with an eye on Taiwan’s strategic position within the United States’s wider Asia strategy, this article roughly categorizes four major roles of Taiwan: Taiwan Card, Strategic Inaction, Marginalization, and Abandoning Taiwan, ranked from highest to lowest strategic value.

positioned as the “Taiwan Card” in the rebalancing strategy of the Obama administration. However, it gradually moved from “strategic inaction” to the much lower role of “marginalization” in Trump’s era.

Taiwan Card: Obama’s Preservation of Taiwan’s Value

Under President Obama’s rebalancing strategy Taiwan was of significantly higher geopolitical strategic value than under Donald Trump. Taiwan’s strategic value was mainly demonstrated in the following aspects. First, at the level of Sino-U.S. relations, the Obama administration adopted a policy towards Taiwan rigidly abiding the Three U.S.-China Joint Communiques, the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, and Six Assurances. This policy indicated that the United States did not intend to change the status quo of Cross-Strait relations, which was one of the most sensitive issues for Beijing.

Second, rather than officially encompassing Taiwan into its alliance system, the Obama administration preferred to emphasize the friendly partnership with the Taipei government through informal approaches. For example, although then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton did not mention the role of Taiwan in her article titled America’s Pacific Century—which was widely considered the formal declaration of Obama’s rebalancing strategy—she unofficially defined Taiwan as an important security and economic partner of America within the Asia-Pacific region.

In this way, Obama’s policy did not weaken the role of Taiwan but obscured Taiwan as a strategic card andincreasing its flexibility in the interaction with the Chinese government.

Third, at the tactical level, the Obama government intended to use the Taiwan as a “counterweight” to balance the relations between mainland China and the United States. Obama’s arms sale after the historical meeting between Xi Jinping and Ma Ying-jeou might be a suitable case to demonstrate how Taiwan acted as a counterweight in Sino-U.S. relations. In this regard, Obama’s strategic design not only essentially enhanced the significance of Taiwan in the Asia-Pacific region, but was also helpful in preserving the strategic value of Taiwan with a flexible application of the Taiwan Card, when required.

From Taiwan Card to Marginalization

The adjustment of America’s grand strategy is usually accompanied by a presidential rotation. Donald Trump, the new president of the United States of America, has an unpredictable behavioural style, which may ultimately lead to a very different foreign strategy compared with the Obama administration.

As a key pillar of the Asia-Pacific strategy for America, the policy towards Taiwan is inevitably influenced by the change of president in America. In other words, America’s new Taiwan policy is largely determined by Trump’s strategic idea (or lack thereof) of Asia-Pacific region. While Trump’s strategy is ambiguous, it is still possible for observers to trace the characteristics of his ideas, which mainly consist of three elements: the guiding principle, tactics, and issue-orientation.

The only thing that Trump does not deny since he took office is the principle of “America First,” which requires Washington to replace “Globalism” with an America-centric approach. Extended to foreign strategy, the America First principle of the Trump administration asserts that the interests of traditional allies are tradeable and the strategic credibility of alliances is not as important.

From a tactical perspective, the Trump administration prefers to interplay with China through deal-making negotiations, which differs from Obama’s reconstruction of rules and institutions in the Asia-Pacific region to balance the rise of China. In regards to issue-orientation, Donald Trump departs from various issues—ranging from Taiwan and North Korea — by proposing a complete and clear strategic layout for the Asia-Pacific region. The aforementioned elements construct Trump’s ideas and beliefs of the Asia-Pacific strategy, with the Taiwan problem becoming the first issue to be faced with his strategic ideas.

The consumption of Taiwan began with the phone call between the leaders of the Washington and Taipei governments in December 2016, when president-elect Trump broke the unspoken rules between mainland China and the United States to have a formal communication with Tsai Ing-wen.

This unexpected action caused a wide-range of international responses. Following the call, Trump further asserted that the United States did not necessarily have to stick to its long-standing position that Taiwan is a part of “One China,” bringing into question nearly four decades of policy. This certainly triggered a great discontent from the Chinese government. However, the real rationale behind Trump’s challenge of “One China” can be interpreted as follows:

Firstly, relying on America First, Trump’s calculation of challenging “One China” is not to reaffirm the commitment of security and defence on Taiwan but is to rather rapidly raise the strategic value of the Taiwan Card as a bargaining chip in the economic and trade negotiation with mainland China. Secondly, Trump’s deal-making negotiation set Taiwan as a product, increasing the possibility of exchanging vital interests between mainland China and the United States. Thirdly, Trump’s issue-orientation may make his strategic attention quickly shift when such issue can no longer provide an attractive interest in satisfying his America First principle. In other words, while Taiwan attracted a wide-range of international attention in the short term, Trump’s policy towards Taiwan may lead to the effect of excessive consumption, which is an unaffordable price for Tsai Ing-wen administration.


The overuse of Taiwan is further demonstrated after the Trump and Tsai phone call incident. In February 2017, Trump realized his return of “One China” when he had a phone communication with Xi Jinping. In the first Xi-Trump meeting held in April, Trump reiterated that he would honour “One China” to maintain the stable and friendly relations with mainland China, causing him to reject Tsai’s request for another phone call and avoid making trouble for President Xi Jinping. Apart from the regular resistance of the Chinese government, the continued arms sales to Taiwan during Trump’s administration did not trigger a significant amount of international attention because the amount and type of weapons were not beyond expected. Regarding the most recent interactions between the United States and mainland China, Trump just repeated his stance to honour the “One China” principle during the second Xi-Trump meeting.

In addition, the author argues that the overused effect will be increasingly exaggerated because of other sparking issues generated by the complex and volatile Asia-Pacific situation. As previously discussed, the issue-orientation indicates that many other, more attractive issues may distract Trump’s attention from the Taiwan problem. For example, the new round of the North Korea nuclear crisis has become the main field for the Sino-U.S. political struggle in the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, even if the nuclear crisis could be peacefully resolved, the Trump administration still has to confront various issues, including South China Sea disputes, U.S.-Russian relations, and the new strategic concept of “Indo-Pacific,” which are seemingly much more attractive than an excessively consumed Taiwan problem.

In this vein, from Obama to Trump, a possible scenario for the change of Taiwan’s strategic role is as follows. Attributable to the overuse of Taiwan by Trump in his transition period, the strategic role of Taiwan transformed from the Taiwan Card to Strategic Inaction. Complicated by other issues in the Asia-Pacific region, the strategic role of Taiwan may further evolve into Marginalization in Trump’s following term. Thus, to avoid being abandoned, the self-preservation of Taiwan’s strategic value has become one of the most urgent tasks for Tsai’s administration.

Derek Ye Xiao Di is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science, National Taiwan University. He has previously written for The News Lens International. Image Credit: CC by White House/ Flickr


  1. China values Taiwan
    (1) as source of investment and technological know-how,
    (2) as part of the nationalistic narrative about restoring territorial integrity, thus regaining dignity lost during the century of humiliation.

    While the value of (1) is diminished considerably due to China catching up fast economically and technologically, the value of (2) is increasing due to nationalistic narratives gradually surpassing in prominence the prosperity narrative that is loosing its lustre in the wake of weakening growth rates.

    The U.S.A. values Taiwan
    (3) as an alternative source of electronics and other goods that is not in immediate danger of drying up should the relations with China ever get hostile,
    (4) as a lever to dampen Chinese ambitions that might infringe on its interests, by denying the realisation of China’s desire to gain de facto sovereignty over Taiwan.

    While the value of (3) is rather tiny due to relatively decreasing trade volume and due to close spatial proximity of Taiwan to China, the value of (4) is increasing with China’s growing assertiveness in the region and around the world.

    In spite of the shifting values in the relations among the three protagonists during the last three decades the political status quo held. But this is going to change sooner than later.

    While previous administrations of the U.S.A. valued Taiwan as a strategic asset, the current administration apparently values Taiwan as a tactical asset. This change is significant because strategic assets tend to be maintained carefully for the long term while tactical assets tend to be used as needed with little regard to long term sustainability.

    And this change is going to be permanent, regardless who will be the next president because the U.S.A. is suffering from global overstretch. The pain this causes at home made Trump’s ‘America first’-slogan work so well for him.

    The U.S.A. will not have the strength nor the will to defend Taiwan once China starts to impose its sovereignty on Taiwan in earnest. And China is going to do this by tightening its grip on Taiwan steadily such weakening its resolve to defend its independence. In the end, after preparing patiently and assiduously, China is going to showcase its military prowess by occupying Taiwan in a swift military operation, such rendering Taiwan the chicken that is killed to scare the monkeys in the region and beyond.

  2. Taiwan is helpless, vulnerable and exposed being Trump’s ‘Taiwan card’ that is played at the player’s convenience with little, if any, regard to Taiwan’s needs and desires, fearing all the time to be ‘abandoned’ (discarded) without ado once the card has fulfilled its purpose as bargaining chip in a deal that bypasses Taiwan completely and does not bring it any benefits.

    I would not want to aspire to such a position nor would I be motivated to maintain it.

    Are there no other options for Taiwan? Is being someone’s card really Taiwan’s best hope to maintain its independence?

  3. This article does not accurately reflect U.S. Taiwan policy under Trump. There has not been, nor will there be any “deal” between the U.S. and China with regard to Taiwan. Taiwan’s geo-strategic position, as well as its status as a democracy, is too important for the U.S. to allow for the contemplation of a serious change in Taiwan policy. Moreover, and drastic change to Taiwan’s current status would threaten the core of American presence and reputation in Asia.
    If anything, U.S. support to Taiwan has increased under Trump. Randall Schriver, a strongly pro-Taiwan figure, was recently appointed as Deputy Secretary of Defense for East Asia. Congress has contemplated passing bills which would strengthen military support to Taiwan, and ROC military personnel have been allowed to participate in more military activities in Hawaii.
    If the PRC makes the mistake of using force against Taiwan, the United States, and very possibly Japan as well, will go to war with China. And given the immense burden and risk of amphibious invasions, China will lose.

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