The Stability-Instability Paradox, Misperception, and Escalation Control in South Asia

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The United States and the Soviet Union managed to avoid nuclear and conventional warfare during the Cold War, while jockeying for advantage in a myriad of ways, including proxy wars and a succession of crises that became surrogates for direct conflict. International relations and deterrence theorists aptly described this tense standoff in which much blood and treasure was expended—but without direct conflict—as the “stability-instability paradox.”

The stability-instability paradox was embedded in the enormity of the stakes involved in crossing the nuclear threshold. As posited by western deterrence theorists, offsetting nuclear capabilities and secure, second-strike capabilities would induce special caution, providing the basis for war prevention and escalation control. Offsetting nuclear deterrents channeled the superpower competition into “safer” pursuits, one object of which would be to impose penalties on an adversary without inducing direct conflict.

The stability-instability paradox was identified rather early in the Cold War, as western strategists weighed the consequences of a Soviet Union able to produce thermonuclear weapons. In 1954, B. H. Liddell Hart reflected a widely-held view that, “to the extent that the H[hydrogen] bomb reduces the likelihood of full-scale war, it increases the possibility of limited war pursued by widespread local aggression.”1 One of the reasons for rolling out the nuclear declaratory policy of massive retaliation during the Eisenhower administration was to warn against such adventurism.

The US doctrine of massive retaliation was quickly qualified and subsequently shelved as a declaratory policy because it was not credible and could not be counted on to deter the unwanted eventualities that prompted its articulation. The Soviet Union as well as the United States could retaliate in a massive fashion, so this threat invited a bluff that could be called. In Glenn Snyder’s words, the Soviets could still engage in “a range of minor ventures

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which they can undertake with impunity, despite the objective existence of some probability of retaliation.”

Massive retaliation gave way to the quest for flexible nuclear war-fighting options and limited war doctrine, but these calibrations never really altered the fundamental precepts of the stability-instability paradox. Robert Jervis summarized this dilemma as follows: “To the extent that the military balance is stable at the level of all-out nuclear war, it will become less stable at lower levels of violence.”

The purpose of this essay is to explore the extent to which the stability-instability paradox is applicable to the subcontinent, drawing upon the work of western and South Asian strategists. One central tenet of the stability-instability paradox—that offsetting nuclear capabilities will increase tensions between adversaries—has already been amply demonstrated in South Asia. While India’s difficulties in Kashmir are rooted in poor governance and domestic grievances, Pakistan’s active support for separatism and militancy in Kashmir has notably coincided with its acquisition of covert nuclear capabilities. Tensions between India and Pakistan have intensified further since both nations tested nuclear weapons in 1998. A nuclearized subcontinent has already produced a succession of nuclear-tinged crises and one conflict that was limited in time, space, as well as in the choice of weapons used.

This high-altitude conflict above Kargil in 1999 was less than a full-blown war but far more than the skirmishing elsewhere along the Kashmir divide. A review committee assessing this conflict established by the Indian government asked, “Did the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in May 1998 rule out a major conventional war between them?” Its answer constituted a partial acknowledgement of the applicability of the stability-instability paradox to a distinctly non-western setting: “Possibly not; but only up to a given threshold, which margin was exploited by Pakistan.”

Whether the second central tenet of the stability-instability paradox—that, despite increased tensions and severe crises, nuclear-armed adversaries will avoid a major conflict or a nuclear exchange—applies to the subcontinent cannot be answered with confidence at this juncture. So far, India and Pakistan, like the Soviet Union and the United States, have been fortunate to avoid a nuclear exchange. It is possible that this luck will hold and that New Delhi and Islamabad will make concerted, joint efforts to reduce nuclear risks. The applicability of the second tenet of the stability-instability paradox to South Asia may also become more evident once India and Pakistan feel completely assured that they have acquired secure, second-strike capabilities. The jury is still out on these matters, but some grounds for optimism lie in the resumption of bilateral dialogue on nuclear risk reduction, Kashmir, and other matters. It is, however,

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far too early to declare that the tide has turned and that offsetting nuclear capabilities have ushered in a new era of stability on the subcontinent.

Western experience suggests that constructive engagement between nuclear adversaries can follow chastening experiences of flirting with disaster. The Cuban missile crisis occurred fourteen years after the Soviet Union joined the United States as a nuclear-weapon state. Within twelve months, both nations implemented a “hotline” agreement and negotiated an atmospheric nuclear test ban treaty. The Kargil conflict occurred perhaps ten years after both India and Pakistan covertly acquired nuclear weapon capabilities. After Kargil, bilateral relations were too strained to permit the resumption of dialogue on nuclear matters. Then came the prolonged crisis during most of 2002, when the Pakistan and Indian armies were posed for another war. These two chastening experiences seem to have provided the impetus for constructive engagement on nuclear risk reduction by India and Pakistan as seen in the June 2004 expert level talks on nuclear confidence building measures. The talks culminated in a joint statement calling on both sides to upgrade the existing hotline between the Directors-General of Military Operations (DGMO); establish a dedicated and secure hotline between the two foreign secretaries; extend the unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing; and take steps toward the conclusion of an agreement on the pre-notification of missile flight testing.6

DETERRENCE OPTIMISTS

Two camps of deterrence theorists have formed over whether a nuclearized subcontinent will prevent a major conflict and foster escalation control.7 One camp might be called deterrence optimists.8 This camp naturally includes Indian and Pakistani strategists who chafed at western efforts to prevent new members from joining the nuclear club. Nuclear optimists in South Asia point directly to western experience to bolster their case. As the former Indian Minister of External Affairs, Jaswant Singh, wrote, “If deterrence works in the West—as it so obviously appears to, since Western nations insist on continuing to possess nuclear weapons—by what reasoning will it not work in India?”9 Similarly, Vijai Nair, an early Indian advocate of nuclear weapons, pointedly noted that, “[T]here has been no direct conflict between states of the Western world,

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5 The best narrative of India’s nuclear ambitions is George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), pp. 293–333. A companion volume for Pakistan’s nuclear program has yet to be written.
7 For a clear exposition of these alternative views, see Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, A Debate (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995).
8 These terms are adapted and borrowed from Scott Sagan, Ibid., and Peter R. Lavoy’s review essay of the debate between Sagan and Waltz, “The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation,” Security Studies 4, no. 4 (Summer 1995), pp. 695–753.
endowed with nuclear power...while conflict has been the order of the day in the developing, non-nuclear Third World.”10

The ranks of deterrence optimists include J.N. Dixit, now the national security adviser to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Writing in 2002, Dixit concluded:

[[In some respects, India should be relieved Pakistan has gone ahead and tested its nuclear devices and declared itself a nuclear weapons state. Such a move has ensured greater transparency about Pakistan’s capacities and intentions. It also removes the complexes, suspicions, and uncertainties about each other’s nuclear capacities. A certain parity in nuclear weapons and missile capabilities will put in place structured and mutual deterrents. These could persuade the Governments of India and Pakistan to discuss bilateral disputes in a more rational manner.11

Perhaps the most important, early conceptualizer of India’s nuclear deterrent, former Army Chief K. Sundarji, flatly predicted that nuclear deterrence would add stability and peace and that “the only salvation is for both countries to follow policies of cooperation and not confrontation...A mutual minimum nuclear deterrent will act as a stabilizing factor. Pakistan will see it as counteracting India’s superior conventional power potential and providing a more level playing field. The chances of conventional war between the two will be less likely than before.”12

Sundarji’s optimism suffuses Raj Chengappa’s insider account of India’s nuclear and missile decision-making, which is titled Weapons of Peace. In Chengappa’s narrative, Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee is portrayed as thinking that nuclear testing by India and Pakistan would mean an end to war on the subcontinent.13 Similarly, Jasjit Singh, a leading Indian commentator on strategic affairs, has argued that with the advent of offsetting nuclear capabilities, “Deterrence will continue, but on a higher level. I don’t think we are going to see a slide toward instability. I don’t think anybody will allow it to happen.”14

This view was widely echoed in Pakistan. At a symposium convened by the Institute of Policy Studies in 1995, General K.M. Arif declared that, “The nuclear option will promote regional peace and create stability,” while Air Marshal Zulfikar Ali Khan opined that nuclear weapons “make wars hard to

10 Nuclear India (Hartford, WI: Spencer & Lancer, 1992), p. 79.
start.” 15 16 The accomplished Pakistani diplomat and former Foreign Minister, Abdul Sattar, concluded that, “attainment of nuclear capabilities by Pakistan and India has helped promote stability and prevented dangers of war despite the crises that have arisen from time to time…Self-interest itself should persuade Pakistan and India to exercise due restraint. Continuance of responsible conduct is likely also because it could gain greater tolerance of their nuclear policies.” 17

During this period, a former Chief of the Army Staff, General M. Aslam Beg, summarized the prevailing view in Pakistan that, “It is the nuclear deterrent that has kept wars in South Asia at bay.” 18 The “father” of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb, Abdul Qadeer Khan, is reported to have told The Times of Oman that, “Anyone will have to think [a] hundred times before they try to indulge in any misadventure against Pakistan. I don’t care if somebody disagrees, but I consider nuclear weapons as weapons of peace”—echoing similar views within the Indian nuclear establishment, as chronicled by Chengappa. “A nuclear Pakistan,” in A.Q. Khan’s view, “means safety, security, and peace of mind.” 19

Assessments of the stabilizing consequences of offsetting nuclear capabilities have not been confined to deterrence theorists in South Asia. According to Sumit Ganguly,

Despite this tension-ridden relationship and contrary to a number of dire warnings, it is unlikely that India and Pakistan are on the verge of another war, let alone a nuclear war…The possession of nuclear weapons on both sides has, in all likelihood, introduced elements of caution among strategic elites in the region. 20

Likewise, Devin T. Hagerty concluded that, “There is no more ironclad law in international relations than this: nuclear weapon states do not fight wars with one another.” 21 Nuclear weapons on the subcontinent, in Haggerty’s view, “deters nuclear and conventional aggression, but not the unconventional military operations characteristic of guerrilla warfare.” 22 Ashley Tellis’ exhaustive review of India’s emerging nuclear posture also concludes with an upbeat

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19 “‘N-arms weapons of peace,’” The Hindu, August 26, 2002.
22 Ibid., p. 39.
assessment: “A reasonably high degree of deterrence stability currently exists within the greater South Asia region…It is not unreasonable to expect that the acknowledged presence of nuclear weapons on all sides would inhibit any interactive sequences that could lead to serious forms of deterrence breakdown in the future.”

DETERRENCE PESSIMISTS

Those who hold diametrically opposed views might be called deterrence pessimists. This camp works from very different assumptions and arrives at deeply troubling conclusions. In this view, the situation in South Asia, like that during the Cold War, is far from stable and could lead to inadvertent escalation. As Robert Jervis notes, “It is rational to start a war one does not expect to win…if it is believed that the likely consequences of not fighting are even worse. War could also come through inadvertence, loss of control, or irrationality.”

A close observer of South Asia, Neil Joeck, argues that, India and Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities have not created strategic stability [and] do not reduce or eliminate factors that contributed to past conflicts…Far from creating stability, these basic nuclear capabilities have led to an incomplete sense of where security lies. Nuclear weapons may make decision-makers in New Delhi and Islamabad more cautious, but sources of conflict immune to the nuclear threat remain. Limited nuclear capabilities increase the potential costs of conflict, but do little to reduce the risk of it breaking out.

Similarly, V.R. Raghavan is far from sanguine about the trajectory of Indo-Pakistan relations:

The conclusions drawn in New Delhi from the Kargil experience are significant. Instead of seeking a stable relationship on the basis of nuclear weapon capabilities, Pakistan has used nuclear deterrence to support aggression. Kargil indicated that armed with nuclear weapons, Pakistan has increased confidence that it could raise the conflict thresholds with India. It demonstrated a willingness to take greater risks in conflict escalation.

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Raghavan concludes that, “the probability of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan is high, in the event the two countries engage in direct military conflict.” P.R. Chari also belongs to the camp of nuclear pessimists. He argues that, “The nuclearized environment in South Asia has not informed the leaderships in both countries to observe restraint in making provocative and inflammatory public declarations.” In his view, the combination of harsh rhetoric, provocative action, and the absence of trust and communication channels between Indian and Pakistani leaders invites destabilizing actions and escalation.

Nuclear pessimists can also be found within the ranks of veteran observers in Pakistan. Talat Masood has written that, “It would be dangerous for either country to presume that its nuclear capability provides a cover for high-risk strategies or gives immunity from an all-out conventional war.” Columnist M.B. Naqvi has concluded that, “The point is that nuclear weapons, by their mere presence, have actually proved to be a deeply destabilizing factor.”

Several deterrence and international relations theorists straddle these camps. Henry Kissinger has written that, “Nuclear Weapons have rendered war between countries possessing them less likely—though this statement is unlikely to remain valid if nuclear weapons continue to proliferate into countries with a different attitude toward human life or unfamiliar with their catastrophic impact.” Kissinger doesn’t tell us whether India or Pakistan fits into this category. John Mueller argues that, “Nuclear weapons neither crucially define a fundamental stability nor threaten severely to disturb it.” In Mueller’s view, “what deters is the belief that escalation to something intolerable will occur, not so much what the details of the ultimate unbearable punishment are believed to be.”

Some close observers of South Asia have also introduced important qualifiers to relatively upbeat assessments. Ashley Tellis, for example, notes that “weak state structures” and “deficient strategic decision making” skewed by “severe motivational and cognitive biases” could produce a breakdown in nuclear deterrence in a deep crisis. This author, at least for now, belongs in the

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27 Ibid., p. 82.
31 “America at the Apex: Empire or Leader?” The National Interest, no. 64 (Summer 2001), p. 13.
34 India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture, pp. 743–4.
camp of deterrence pessimists, as conditions are not present in South Asia to provide a lasting basis for nuclear stabilization. I am, however, willing and eager to switch camps once the governments of India and Pakistan commit to constructive engagement and make concerted and sustained efforts to reduce nuclear risks.

**INSTABILITY AND RISK**

The earliest stages of offsetting nuclear capabilities between states with significant grievances are inherently the most dangerous. During this period, lines of communication tend to be unreliable, and crisis management procedures are especially ad hoc. As Richard Betts has noted, “Confusion can be used against an enemy by increasing his uncertainty and encouraging caution, but it also widens the range for miscalculation.”

In the early stages of developing nuclear arsenals, the size and disposition of each side’s nuclear deterrent are mostly opaque to the other, which can prompt worst-case assessments during an intense crisis. Another core element of strategic stability identified by western deterrence strategists—secure second-strike capabilities—is difficult to constitute during the early stages of a new nuclear rivalry. New nuclear capabilities, as well as uncertainties regarding the nuclear balance, can encourage risk taking. In this dangerous passage, the United States and the Soviet Union went eyeball-to-eyeball over Berlin and Cuba, and the two pairings of contiguous nuclear-weapon states—China and the USSR as well as India and Pakistan—both fought border clashes soon after these adversaries demonstrated offsetting nuclear capabilities.

The concepts of escalation control and stable nuclear deterrence presume rational decisions by rational actors, even in the deepest crisis. There are, however, extremist groups in Pakistan and India that would view the advent of crisis as an opportunity rather than as a problem to be contained. Western deterrence theorists never had to address the factors of religious extremism and jihad. Deterrence optimists also presume that “Murphy’s Law” does not apply to nuclear weapons—at least not to the extent that an accident or a chain reaction of miscalculation, error, chance, or misuse of authority would lead to a crossing of the nuclear threshold. These presumptions were rather generous during the Cold War, as have been amply documented.

Additional reasons for pessimism are rooted in uncertainties associated with the nuclear equation in South Asia. It is hard for Indian and Pakistani officials to predict with accuracy the holdings of the other side. In the early phases of a

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nuclear rivalry, opacity is considered essential to deterrence. Moreover, India and Pakistan rely primarily on human intelligence on nuclear matters, since national technical means are minimal. Human intelligence can be spotty and unreliable. The potential for misestimating an adversary’s nuclear holdings is therefore considerable. One can envision how misestimates might be stabilizing, if imperfect intelligence reinforces caution in a crisis. Misestimates could also be destabilizing, if the reverse is true. Even if both adversaries are aware of the nuclear balance and acknowledge its equality, there are no guarantees against adventurism. Indeed, the first tenet of the stability-instability paradox predicts adventurism.

Sumit Ganguly argues that the stability-instability paradox will hold for the foreseeable future in South Asia because “neither side has the requisite capability to pursue a decapitating first strike against the other.” Deterrence optimists presume that India’s nuclear arsenal is secure from attack, given its large landmass. It is necessary, but insufficient, for New Delhi’s nuclear assets to be secure from attack, if India’s national command authority could be subject to decapitation. India appears not to have attached a high priority to addressing this vulnerability. The Indian Nuclear Command Authority only decided to build two bunkers to protect top officials from a potential nuclear strike, the first in New Delhi and the second within 250 miles of the city, in September 2003, five years after India became an overt nuclear power. A “recessed” deterrent or a “force in being” that cannot be constituted or deployed because of a decapitating strike might be unusable.

India’s vulnerability can be fixed without resorting to destabilizing actions in a crisis. Pakistan’s primary vulnerability is quite different, and “fixing” it would appear to require potentially destabilizing steps. Pakistan’s means of delivery for its nuclear deterrent resides primarily at missile and air bases, which constitute a relatively small number of fixed aim points that could be reached quickly by Indian strike capabilities. Perhaps over time, Pakistan will acquire a more secure and stabilizing nuclear capability at sea, but for the foreseeable future, its national command authority’s options to reduce structural vulnerabilities in deep crisis appear limited to moving missiles and warheads away from bases and storage facilities, employing satellite basing of some kind, and increasing alert rates. All of these steps increase the possibility of unfortunate events and misreads by foreign observers.

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40 These terms have been borrowed from Jasjit Singh and Ashley Tellis, respectively.
41 There are few public assessments written by Pakistani authors familiar with these dilemmas. One worth reading is Tariq Mahmud Ashraf, *Aerospace Power: The Emerging Strategic Dimension* (Peshawar: PAF Book Club, 2003).
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Should New Delhi decide, for whatever reason, to move toward a ready arsenal, Islamabad must contemplate—and compensate for—its nightmare scenario of preemption. India’s current vulnerability associated with command and control, combined with Pakistan’s structural vulnerability, could be mutually and negatively reinforcing in the event of another severe crisis. In such circumstances, one side’s quest for protection is likely to feed the other’s concerns over preemption. Until stabilizing steps are taken to clarify retaliatory capabilities, the best safeguards against worst cases are the continuation of relaxed nuclear postures and the avoidance of crises.

Nuclear stabilization presumes adequate back-up from conventional forces. Conventional balances are not easy to calculate, because advantages in some categories might be offset in others. Moreover, it is easier to defend than to advance, particularly in the rugged terrain along much of the Kashmir divide. In South Asia, the conventional military balance is shifting steadily in India’s favor. From 1995-1999, South Asian military expenditures grew more than for any region of the world, with India’s growth rate three times that of Pakistan. This disparity, which could enable the Indian military to employ new military tactics in future conflicts with Pakistan, has grown even more appreciably in recent years. As the Indian armed forces begin to absorb the necessity for combined arms operations, Pakistan’s armed forces remain plagued by a “lack of coordination and joint planning.” Critical deficiencies in Pakistan and growing conventional capabilities in India could increase nuclear risks – unless new peacemaking initiatives are forthcoming.

New Delhi’s procurements of advanced combat aircraft, deep surveillance capabilities, and supersonic cruise missiles are sources of concern in Pakistan. These capabilities appear well suited to support new conventional and limited war-fighting options. Growing Indian air superiority has ramifications for escalation control and for the stability of nuclear deterrence on the subcontinent in at least two major respects. First, the attrition of the Pakistani Air Force in air-to-air combat in a limited war scenario could constitute a “red line” that cannot be predicted with assurance. Second, Pakistani military planners would view Indian air power as the quickest and most accurate means for deep strikes against nuclear, as well as conventional targets.

More reason for deterrence pessimism can be found in the absence of nuclear risk reduction measures on the subcontinent. The author has argued elsewhere that ten key commandments of nuclear risk reduction evolved over

42 India’s military expenditures rose an average of 8.8 percent from 1995 to 1999; Pakistan’s rose an average of 2.9 percent. In 1999, the last year for which official US data are available, India spent $11.3 billion on military expenditures; Pakistan spent $3.5 billion. (US Department of State, Bureau of Verification and Compliance, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1999-2000 (Washington DC: Library of Congress, 2002), pp. 2–3).

time to help keep the Cold War from becoming white-hot.44 These commandments are:

- Do not change the territorial status quo in sensitive areas by use of force.
- Avoid nuclear brinksmanship.
- Avoid dangerous military practices.
- Put in place special reassurance measures for ballistic missiles and other nuclear forces.
- Implement properly treaty obligations, risk-reduction, and confidence-building measures.
- Agree on verification arrangements, including intrusive monitoring.
- Establish reliable lines of communication, between political leaders and between military leaders.
- Establish redundant and reliable command and control arrangements as well as intelligence-gathering capabilities to know what the other side is up to, especially in a crisis.
- Keep working hard on these arrangements. Improve them. Don’t take anything for granted.
- Hope for plain dumb luck or divine intervention.45

It is unsettling to note that none of the key elements of nuclear risk reduction (with the possible exception of good fortune) are now present in South Asia. Instead, Pakistan remains opposed to the status quo in Kashmir, the contiguous territory that has sparked previous wars and, except for brief cease fires, almost daily friction between the Indian and Pakistani forces that are deployed along this divide. Both governments have resorted to brinksmanship over Kashmir, India by mobilizing and threatening war, Pakistan by initiating the Kargil incursion and by its commitment to a Kashmir policy that has relied on militancy to punish India and to leverage favorable outcomes.

In this sense, both countries seem to have copied a page from early Cold War playbooks on how to demonstrate resolve. Bernard Brodie used this formulation: “The best way, perhaps the only way, for us to avert not only defeat but unnecessary escalation is to demonstrate clearly that our readiness to...

45 Desmond Ball, Hans Bethe, Bruce Blair, and others compiled a shorter list of key measures: Do not use deadly force against an adversary; do not force an adversary to choose between humiliation and escalation; do not use military forces to undermine an adversary in geographic areas he deems vital; do not use force against an adversary’s ally; do not use force to dramatically alter the status quo in a sensitive region; and do not initiate horizontal escalation. *Crisis Stability and Nuclear War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Peace Studies Program, 1987), p. 62.
take risks is not less than theirs." For most of the past fifteen years, brinksmanship in South Asia has taken the form of dangerous military practices along the Kashmir divide, including the overrunning of border posts and the “routine” use of small arms and mortars as well as artillery firing. In 1984 Indian forces preemptively occupied an un-demarcated glacial region, citing Pakistani intentions to get there first. Aerial incursions are also a frequent occurrence, notwithstanding signed “confidence-building” measures designed to end such activity.

Deterrence optimists argue that brinksmanship in South Asia is highly ritualized and even pragmatic. As Satu Limaye has written,

Pakistan and India’s brinksmanship is not wild-eyed but designed to meet policy objectives. Pakistan, as the weaker state in the bilateral relationship, ratchets up tensions over Kashmir to garner external (mainly US) pressure on India to come to the bargaining table. India uses coercive diplomacy to bring US pressure to bear on Pakistan to halt support for militants and their infiltration into Kashmir. Both states seek to achieve their ends without war: Pakistan because it might lose, India because it might not win...In using brinksmanship, both India and Pakistan ultimately want to be held back while having the United States push their interests forward.

There is much insight in this analysis but it presumes a high degree of control over events by national leaders. The “pragmatic,” self-interested use of brinksmanship leaves much to chance. As Thomas C. Schelling has cautioned, “Brinksmanship involves getting onto the slope where one may fall in spite of his own best efforts to save himself, dragging his adversary with him.” Responses to repeated instances of brinksmanship could change, and Washington’s ability to broker satisfactory outcomes could be diminished from one crisis to the next. If any of the three parties decides to change the rules of the game, outcomes could be surprisingly different.

For both tenets of the stability-instability paradox to be in place, thereby preventing unintended escalation, lines of communication need to be reliable, the messages conveyed over these channels need to be trustworthy, and they need to be interpreted properly. As noted above, the United States and the Soviet Union began to address the requirement of more reliable and quicker means of communication after the Cuban missile crisis. In contrast, after the Kargil crisis,

47 Some in Pakistan cite India’s occupation of the Siachen Glacier as the predicate to the Kargil operation. See, for example, Shireen M. Mazari, *The Kargil Conflict 1999* (Islamabad: Feroz Sons, 2003).
communication between India and Pakistan worsened, and then ceased altogether. Efforts to improve communication channels were the first item of business once official bilateral dialogue finally resumed in 2004.

Upgrades in hotlines and the establishment of nuclear risk-reduction centers are essential. Even more essential are changing destabilizing policies, avoiding brinksmanship, and reading of one’s nemesis properly. Intelligence assessments in South Asia have been badly wrong in the past, resulting in severe consequences. Most notably, the initiation or outcome of wars—and sometimes both—have come as a surprise to one side or the other. For example, the outbreak of the 1999 high-altitude conflict above Kargil came as a surprise to India; its outcome came as a surprise to Pakistan. Robert Jervis and others reminded us during the Cold War that, “Deterrence succeeds or fails in the mind of the attacker.” But Indian and Pakistani leaders have repeatedly misestimated each other’s intentions.

Escalation control requires a careful and correct reading of one’s adversary. Regrettably, problems of misperception on the subcontinent have grown as the wall of separation between India and Pakistan becomes higher and thicker. One leading Indian strategic analyst, Raja Menon, acknowledges this danger, while identifying its source as “the belief among some Indian academics in the exaggerated resolve of the Pakistanis.” In Menon’s view, “an escalatory spiraling out of control could only grow from a Pakistani initiative.” There is much room for misjudgment in this analysis. The Global War on Terrorism declared by Washington provides further grounds for misjudgment by Pakistan and India. As Mary Nayak has noted, “Each has misread its closer ties to the United States as evidence that Washington has embraced its perspective. Each has treated the intense engagement and military presence of the United States as insurance against escalation to war.”

Differing Lessons

The ten-month long dual mobilizations in 2002, during which the government of India demanded the cessation of acts of terrorism abetted by Pakistan and the hand-over of leading militants, ended without satisfaction on either count. The resulting lessons learned in both countries could well increase confusion or misjudgments.

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53 Ibid., p. 230.
Within India and Pakistan, official post-mortems predictably put a positive spin on the crisis. President Musharraf declared that, “We have defeated an enemy without fighting a war.” He then added that if Indian troops “took even a step across the international border or LoC (Line of Control), we will not only be in front of them, we will surround them. It will not remain a conventional war.” Prime Minister Vajpayee declared that the extended Indian troop mobilization “sent [a] ‘strong message’ to Pakistan to end cross-border terrorism… I can tell you that the message is working. We’ll make sure that it works.” The Indian Army Chief of Staff during the crisis, General S. Padmanabhan, declared the mobilization “a boon for the armed forces in upgrading training along with equipment availability.” In addition, Padmanabhan noted that infiltration across the LoC had markedly declined, and that a successful state election had been held in Jammu and Kashmir.

Prominent strategists, retired military officers, and journalists in India and Pakistan have differed sharply on the lessons learned from this extended standoff. The national security establishment in Pakistan was mostly upbeat after India’s exercise in coercive diplomacy. According to Shireen M. Mazari, the chair of the government-funded Institute of Strategic Studies in Islamabad, “The reason for the present dissipation of the military threat is primarily the result of Pakistan calling India’s bluff and the major power realizing the need to move India away from its game of brinksmanship.” Some Pakistani military officers viewed the Indian climb-down as evidence of cowardice, and as prompting serious morale problems in the Indian Army. Other military officers privately expressed dismay over the Kargil misadventure.

Indian commentators offered a mixed assessment, with some seeing the glass half-full. The influential editor of The Indian Express, Shekhar Gupta, took solace from the confrontation: “The Pakistani pledge to abjure terrorism now has some international guarantees. Their nuclear bluff has been called—finally we have shown we cannot be blackmailed as we were in 1990.” Similarly, the dean of Indian commentators on national security, K. Subrahmanyam, argued that India’s extended troop mobilization was a success insofar as it served “to compel the United States to apply pressure on Pakistan to promise a visible and

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56 “Warning forced India to pull back troops, says President,” Dawn, December 31, 2002. This statement was subsequently “clarified” by Pakistan’s military spokesman as meaning “unconventional forces and not nuclear or biological weapons.” (“Gen shoots mouth off, backfires,” The Indian Express, December 31, 2002.)
57 “Troop build-up sent strong message to Pak: PM,” The Indian Express, December 13, 2002.
58 “Gen shoots mouth off, backfires,” The Indian Express, December 31, 2002.
60 Interviews with the author, October 7–13, 2002.
61 “One month after Kaluchak: Five lessons we learnt, can’t afford to forget,” The Indian Express, June 15, 2002.
permanent end to cross-border terrorism.” In contrast, several retired military officers were scathing in their assessment of Indian coercive diplomacy, as was General Afsir Karim, editor of Aakrosh (and former editor of the Indian Defence Review), in a published interview:

[T]he troops became mere pawns in the hands of politicians intent on pursuing their own agenda…The troops sweated it out on the borders in extremely harsh environments while the rest of us went about our [sic] normal business of celebrating festivals and holding fashion shows…The aim of coercive diplomacy is basically to demand a particular change in an adversary’s policies with a real and credible threat of devastating punitive action in case of noncompliance...India, for obvious reasons, posed no such threat to Pakistan…Not surprisingly, cross-border terrorism continued unabated and Pakistan seemed far from being coerced.

Outlook magazine’s national security correspondent, V. Sudarshan, heard similar sentiments from prominent members of the Indian national security establishment. He described “seething anger” in the armed forces against coercive diplomacy that, in the words of one source, “achieved so little with so much.” The recently retired Vice Chief of Staff of the Indian Army, General Vijai Oberoi, is quoted as saying, “Instead of terminating it as that point in the graph where the gains from mobilization were headed downwards, we carried it on like a Hindi film.” Vijai Nair added, “The fact that you deployed the entire military and did not take punitive action against terrorists demonstrated to all that New Delhi does not have the political will to use the means it has deliberately created to secure India when the chips are down.” V.K. Sood and Pravin Sawhney reached a similar conclusion: “Facing tremendous pressure, the Indian leadership lacked the stomach to take a war inside Pakistan.”

These divergent views do not provide a sound basis for nuclear stabilization on the subcontinent. When both Indian and Pakistani leaders claim to have succeeded at brinksmanship, they may be inclined to continue such practices. Pakistan’s national security establishment continues to declare confidence in being able to call India’s bluff, while expressing concerns over the shifting military balance. At the same time, significant elements of the Indian national security establishment have expressed deep dissatisfaction with threats that are not backed up by the use of force and are developing new military doctrine and capabilities to enhance limited war options.

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63 ibid.
Renewed brinksmanship could come in the form of more extensive support for *jihadi* groups by Pakistan’s national security establishment, and more aggressive tactics to punish *jihadis* and their sponsors by Indian leaders. This juxtaposition could lead to misestimates and intelligence failures. The initiation of war could again come as a surprise to Pakistan, particularly when India’s vibrant democracy will broadcast mixed messages about the wisdom of engaging in more adventurous military tactics to counter terrorism. Since both military establishments express confidence in achieving their objectives in the event of another war relating to Kashmir, one will be proven wrong in the event of another war.

In this sense, Kashmir can again become a “nuclear flashpoint,” if Pakistan’s national security establishment turns the heat up on Kashmir to punish India and to leverage a favorable outcome to this longstanding dispute. During most of the past fifteen years, escalation control on the subcontinent has depended heavily on two risky assumptions: First, that *jihadi* groups would refrain from such horrendous acts of violence as to spark a war; and second, that the Indian government would refrain from attacking Pakistan in response to lesser grievances. These two assumptions constitute a very poor basis for nuclear stabilization.

Pakistan’s credibility in denying culpability for acts of terror across the Kashmir divide depends upon the extent to which it has ceased providing military, intelligence, communications, and logistical support for *jihadi* groups. Likewise, positive changes in the policies adopted by the government of India toward Kashmir could provide a sustained basis for nuclear stabilization. These include concrete measures to prevent and punish human rights abuses by security forces and sustained, substantive diplomatic engagement with Pakistan over Kashmir. Absent these significant course corrections, additional crises on the subcontinent could be expected. Depending on the severity of future crises, the increased readiness of nuclear capabilities might be expected, including the movement of missiles to complicate targeting and to signal resolve. Nuclear capabilities that are in a high state of readiness or are in motion to reduce their vulnerability could become more susceptible to accidents, sabotage, or breakdowns in command and control.

Deterrence optimists tend to discount accidents, inadvertence, and sabotage as contributing factors in crossing the nuclear threshold. But accidents happened during the Cold War. Fortunately, none produced a mushroom cloud. There were also decisions made by local commanders during deep crises that could have led to misjudgments and grave misfortune.\(^{67}\) Accidents, inadvertent steps,
and misjudgments during crisis could also occur in South Asia. Catalytic acts of terrorism provide additional grounds for concern about escalation control in the subcontinent. The writings of deterrence optimists tend to downplay the factors of religious extremism and terrorism. The possibility of domestic turmoil and its potential impact on command and control – a concern that did not figure prominently during the Cold War, except in screenplays – is also more of a factor on the subcontinent.

MASSIVE RETALIATION

Nuclear doctrines that equate deterrence with massive punishment provide additional grounds for concern about escalation control in the subcontinent. The government of India has publicly declared that, “Nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage.” As former Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes has warned,

   We have been saying all through that the person who heads Pakistan… has been talking about using dangerous weapons, including the nukes. Well, I would reply by saying that if Pakistan has decided that it wants to get itself destroyed and erased from the world map, then it may take this step of madness, but if [it] wants to survive then it would not do so.

The government of Pakistan has not released a draft or official nuclear doctrine for public consumption, but one might reasonably infer from the statements of senior military figures that they, too, endorse a massive response to Indian strikes against sensitive targets or the crossing of Pakistani “red lines.” During the ten-month long dual troop mobilizations in 2002, President Pervez Musharraf traveled to the front and announced that “even an inch” of Indian incursion across the Kashmir divide “will unleash a storm that will sweep the enemy…The people of Pakistan have always had faith in the ability of the armed forces to inflict unbearable damage to the enemy.” In his address to the nation on March 23, 2002, Musharraf declared, “By Allah’s Grace Pakistan today possesses a powerful military might and can give a crushing reply to all types of aggression. Anybody who poses a challenge to our security and integrity would be taught an unforgettable lesson.” In a subsequent address to the nation of May 27, 2002, Musharraf announced, “We do not want war. But if

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71 Available online at http://www.infopak.gov.pk/President_Addresses/Pres_23March.htm.
war is thrust upon us, we would respond with full might, and give a befitting reply.”

The public declarations of Indian and Pakistani leaders endorsing massive retaliation are reminiscent of the tense Cold War standoff in the 1950s. These threats are likely to be as ineffectual on the subcontinent as during the Eisenhower administration. Massive retaliation does not provide an answer to the bloodletting in Jammu and Kashmir nor to ambiguous cases that result in the release of radioactivity. The critique of massive retaliation by Henry Kissinger and other Cold War deterrence strategists still rings true:

> Given the power of modern weapons, a nation that relies on all-out war as its chief deterrent imposes a fearful psychological handicap on itself. The most agonizing decision a statesman can face is whether or not to unleash all-out war; all pressures will make for hesitation, short of a direct attack threatening the national existence…A deterrent which one is afraid to implement when it is challenged ceases to be a deterrent.”

As Thomas C. Schelling wrote, “When the act to be deterred is inherently a sequence of steps whose cumulative effect is what matters, a threat geared to increments may be more credible than one that must be carried out either all at once or not at all.”

A declaratory doctrine of massive retaliation seems particularly ill suited to the circumstances surrounding a nuclear event whose source might not be easily ascertained. Such an event could be caused by an accident, a terrorist act, or an inadvertent conventional strike executed by an air force pilot under orders to avoid known nuclear targets. Under such circumstances, parallel and reinforcing doctrines of massive retaliation constitute a severe impediment to escalation control. Joint adherence to massive retaliation doctrines during the early stages of the nuclear competition in South Asia could result, as Maria Sultan has noted, in deterrence that is based “not on the credibility of the second-strike capability of either side, but on the effectiveness of the first strike.”

The threat of massive retaliation could have utility when the crossings of red lines that would result in the use of nuclear weapons are clear and bright, but such clarity is elusive in international relations. Indeed, it is in the interest of national leaders not to be too precise about the actual location of red lines, since to do so could invite unwelcome actions that approach, but do not cross, these thresholds. Consequently, advertised red lines could be overdrawn and

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74 The Strategy of Conflict, p. 42.
purposefully vague. As Tariq Mahmud Ashraf has noted, the nuclear threshold “has to be credible and vague enough to be visible yet not identifiable by the enemy but also by the world at large.” Ashraf, a retired Pakistani Air Force officer, defined Pakistan’s red lines as:

1. Penetration of Indian forces beyond a certain defined line or crossing of a river.
2. Imminent capture of an important Pakistani city like Lahore or Sialkot.
3. Destruction of Pakistan’s conventional armed forces or other assets beyond an acceptable level.
4. Attack on any of Pakistan’s strategic targets such as dams or nuclear installations like Tarbela, Mangla, Kahuta, Chashma, etc.
5. Imposition of blockade on Pakistan to an extent that it strangulates the continued transportation of vital supplies and adversely affects the war-waging stamina of the country.
6. Indian crossing of the Line of Control to a level that it threatens Pakistan’s control over Azad Kashmir.

A more authoritative figure, Lieutenant General Khalid Kidwai, Director-General of the Strategic Plans Division, offered the following red lines in an interview with two Italian researchers. Kidwai, a key overseer of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent, is reported to have said that Pakistan would resort to nuclear weapons’ use in the event that:

- India attacks Pakistan and conquers a large part of its territory
- India destroys a large part either of its land or air forces
- India proceeds to the economic strangling of Pakistan
- India pushes Pakistan into political destabilization or creates a large scale internal subversion

These red lines represent unacceptable thresholds relating to losses of territory, military capability, economic viability, and political stability. As such, they reflect obvious Pakistani sensitivities. How Indian authorities might translate these markers into war-fighting guidelines, however, is anything but obvious. For example, Pakistan’s vital lines of communication run perilously close to its international border. India does not need to capture a large part of Pakistani territory in order to deliver a humiliating blow. And what constitutes “large” losses of air power? The blockade of Karachi could take many weeks to have a severe impact on the Pakistani economy. When might this red line be crossed? The political stability threshold is the most difficult of all to calibrate, since Pakistan could be destabilized either in the absence of, or resulting from, a war with India.

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76 Aerospace Power, p. 148.
Rather than being clear and bright, red lines can be hidden from view. They could be inadvertently embedded in tactical operations that are not expected to result in the detonation of nuclear weapons. During the “quarantine” of Cuba in the 1962 missile crisis, a red line could have been crossed when a US naval destroyer used depth charges to compel a Soviet submarine to the surface. This red line was avoided when one of three officers on board the sub refused to concur with unauthorized, ad hoc procedures to use a nuclear weapon in extremis.\footnote{Kevin Sullivan, “One word from nuclear war,” \textit{International Herald Tribune}, October 14, 2002.} Analogous events could be imagined in the throes of a deep crisis or limited military engagements in South Asia.

**LIMITED WAR**

During the Cold War, the non-viability of massive retaliation as a nuclear doctrine against less than all-out threats led the United States to explore the concept of limited war. For such contingencies, nuclear doctrine evolved to emphasize limited nuclear strikes, tactical nuclear weapons, and a wide range of employment options. Escalation control in the event of a crossing of the nuclear threshold was a conundrum that was never satisfactorily resolved. Some western deterrence theorists found solace in the pursuit of escalation dominance: superior nuclear capabilities at each rung of the ladder and advantageous nuclear force ratios in the event of all-out war would presumably dissuade the Kremlin from escalating or persuade it to capitulate. Another option was “damage limitation” concepts that bore a strong resemblance to preemptive strikes and that reflected the belief that a nuclear war could be fought and won. Western deterrence strategists inferred a similar animus and logic to the Soviet nuclear posture.\footnote{See, for example, Herman Kahn, \textit{On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios} (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965); Paul H. Nitze, “Assuming Strategic Stability in an Era of Détente,” \textit{Foreign Affairs} 54, no. 2 (January 1976), pp. 208–232; Richard Pipes, “Why the Soviet Union Thinks it Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War,” \textit{Commentary} 74, no. 1 (July 1977), pp. 21–34.}

Despite considerable intellectual effort, western deterrence strategists found no politically acceptable or militarily plausible way to “escape” from deterrence. It was hard to envision how, if the differences between the United States and the Soviet Union had risen to the point of nuclear detonations, the constructs of escalation dominance and damage limitation could have offered a satisfactory outcome. Both superpowers became active partners in the nuclear arms race because neither was willing to surrender or acknowledge disadvantage. The conundrum of escalation control was resolved during the Cold War by avoiding direct conflict and by engaging in the nuclear risk reduction measures enumerated above.

The juxtaposition of India’s nuclear doctrine of massive retaliation with a conventional war-fighting doctrine focusing on limited war presents quite different, but no less challenging dilemmas for escalation control. New Delhi’s
interest in limited war is borne, in part, out of frustration over Pakistan’s use of unconventional methods to bleed India in Jammu and Kashmir. Frustration grew after the successful, but self-punishing, tactics used by Indian forces to repel Pakistani intruders from the heights above Kargil. As the Indian Army Chief during this conflict, V.P. Malik, later observed, [al]though India and Pakistan are nuclear nations, it is not true to say there cannot be a conventional war between them. Kargil proved that. There is a threshold under which a conventional war is possible.80

General Malik’s successor, General S. Padmanabhan, echoed these thoughts:

I am looking at the whole range that constitutes the spectrum [of conflict]. You have low-level conflict on the one end and on the other you have the nuclear war scenario. In between this spectrum is a whole amount of strategic space. This is the space in the middle for conventional operations…Nuclear war fighting is perhaps the last thing in anybody’s mind. What we are looking at is to get an optimal return from conventional warfare.81

Padmanabhan’s successor, General Nirmal Chander Vij, has evidently continued to develop plans and capabilities for a combined arms approach to limited warfare, which has been dubbed the “cold start” in the Indian media.82

New Delhi’s quest to escape from deterrence and to define space for military action below the nuclear threshold continues. The reasons for this quest are clear, since the penalties of the stability-instability paradox have been borne disproportionately by India. Offsetting nuclear capabilities appear to rule out full-scale conventional war, while providing space for Pakistan to support militancy across the Kashmir divide. At the same time, India’s declaratory policy has embraced nuclear minimalism and de-emphasizes limited nuclear options. Can limited war objectives be backed up by a doctrine of massive retaliation in South Asia? Western deterrence theorists explored this terrain without success. Now Indian strategists and military planners are surveying the territory.

The combination of India’s limited war planning and threat of massive retaliation could become an unstable and explosive mix. Both adversaries must agree to limited war options, and both need to understand each other well enough to distinguish bluff from firebreak. They will need superb intelligence

and tight command and control over nuclear forces. Accidents must not happen. To risk all for modest objectives appears nonsensical. Penalties must be credible, otherwise risk-taking by one side will likely prompt risk-taking by the other. Backstopping limited war with the threat of massive retaliation runs the familiar risks of unintended escalation.

Western deterrence strategists have dwelled at length on this dilemma. Neither adversary, as Robert Jervis has written, “can confidently move into an area of significant concern to the other without great risk of incurring very high costs—if not immediately, then as a result of a chain of actions that cannot be entirely foreseen or controlled.”83 Conceiving of nuclear weapons as a firebreak does not necessarily prevent unintended escalation. As Bernard Brodie observed, “The more that confidence in the firebreak is built up, the less is each side restrained from committing larger and larger conventional forces within the limits of its capabilities.”84

ENDURING DILEMMAS OR NEW PROGRESS?

The government of India has been caught on the horns of this dilemma ever since the subcontinent was nuclearized. As a matter of principle (as well as sound judgment), New Delhi refuses to endorse limited nuclear options and the other paraphernalia of nuclear deterrence that drove US and Soviet arsenals to dizzying heights. Instead, New Delhi has embraced the concept of minimal, credible nuclear deterrence. Moving its bomb from the basement to Pokhran has not, however, served an intended purpose of stabilizing the subcontinent.

New Delhi continues to seek favorable military methods to counter Pakistan’s tactics in Kashmir. The device chosen after the terrorist attack on the Indian parliament—keeping battle-ready forces in the field for ten months—is not one that lends itself to repetition, unless the government of India is ready to wage war. Otherwise, the credibility of the threat would be further devalued, while confirming Brodie’s observation, above. The frustrations prompted by previous crises have no doubt contributed to Indian interest in limited war options, which coexist awkwardly with an unlimited nuclear threat. Because this juxtaposition is inherently unstable at this stage of the subcontinent’s nuclear standoff, the possibility of unintended escalation is always present.

One key element of escalation control, as Morton Kaplan wrote in The Strategy of Limited Retaliation, is the “ability of the opponents to see the legitimacy of each other’s claims.”85 It has been very hard for Indian and Pakistani leaders to show such generosity of spirit. Escalation control also requires the ability to reign in wild men eager to pursue violent agendas.

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84 Escalation and the Nuclear Option, p. 124.
Western deterrence strategists never made the acquaintance of the Jaish e-Mohammed or the Lashkar e-Toiba. *Jihadi* wild cards are now mixed into the deck of Indo-Pakistan relations, along with Hindu chauvinists who abet the mass murder of Muslims and mosque demolition. Catalytic acts of terror can again place India and Pakistan at the knife’s edge. Concerns over terrorists acquiring fissile material are present in South Asia, as elsewhere. The dilemma of escalation control was avoided after the attack on the Indian parliament largely because the Indian prime minister wished to avoid a war whose risks were great and benefits modest. A future Indian prime minister, faced with another major provocation, might be working from a different calculus of decision.

In the fifteen years since acquiring nuclear weapons, India and Pakistan have experienced difficult times. The last five years of this stretch have been particularly rough. Before outsiders pass judgment on this record of brinksmanship, it is worth recalling that the first fifteen years of the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union were also very harrowing. The two superpowers looked directly into the nuclear abyss during crises over Berlin and Cuba. After this extremely dangerous passage, Washington and Moscow were finally ready to take steps to reduce nuclear dangers. Only after the Cuban missile crisis did the superpowers agree to improve communication methods and negotiate an end to nuclear testing in the atmosphere. These measures, and others that followed, did not blunt their nuclear rivalry -- far from it. But the rivalry was more predictable and less dangerous. Nuclear dangers were eventually tamed by a long and difficult process of negotiating confidence-building measures, arms control treaties, intrusive verification, and finally, deep cuts in nuclear forces.

The leaders of India and Pakistan face a similar challenge to transition from recurring crises to nuclear safety. This passage can only be traversed safely with sustained collaboration. If so, deterrence optimists will be proven right. After all, India and Pakistan have experienced severe crises, but national leaders have studiously avoided a conventional war that could result in a crossing of the nuclear threshold. National leaders are well aware of the adverse economic consequences of severe crises. They understand the potential consequences of war and the specter of unintended escalation.

Perhaps now, at long last, Pakistan and India are at the beginning of a sustained process of nuclear risk reduction. We know, however, that for five and one-half decades, no one has lost money betting against peace making on the subcontinent. Deterrence pessimists are correct in warning that nuclear risk-reduction measures are not in place. Much could go badly wrong on the subcontinent unless Pakistan’s national security establishment reassesses its Kashmir policy and unless New Delhi engages substantively on Islamabad’s concerns and with dissident Kashmiris. The way out of this morass is widely

This exit strategy points to placing a much higher priority on the well being of Kashmiris – something both governments profess to hold dear, but rarely act upon. If the governments of Pakistan and India were to follow this fundamental guideline, firing would cease permanently along the LoC, the crossings of jihadis and human rights abuses would virtually cease, divided families would be free to meet, and trade and development projects would be encouraged across the Kashmir divide. At the same, we also know that, if Islamabad and New Delhi take concerted actions to change course, those opposed to reconciliation will attempt to blow up the process. The best chance of defusing nuclear danger and controlling escalation lies in political engagement. Nuclear risk reduction begins along the Kashmir divide.