

*Scottish Parliament's Cross-Party Group on Tibet,
Briefing Paper No.4:*
**Self-Immolation amongst Tibetans,
1998-2012**


Contents

Executive Summary.....	1
Introduction.....	3
The Development of Self-Immolation as a Form of Tibetan Protest.....	3
Interpreting Self-Immolation	4
Official and Public Attitudes to Self-Immolation	6
Causes of the Self-Immolations	7
Self-Immolation within the PRC Context	8

Executive Summary

- Since 2009, an escalating number of Tibetans have committed suicide through self-immolation in protest at Chinese rule in Tibet. While a small number of self-immolations have occurred amongst the Tibetan refugee communities of South Asia, the overwhelming majority have been in the Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures of Qinghai, Gansu and Sichuan, most especially around Kirti Monastery in Ngaba. In some cases, funerals and access to the bodies of self-immolators have been restricted by the local authoritiesⁱ.
- The majority of self-immolators are monks, nuns and students, protesting restrictions on religious practice and the teaching of Tibetan language and calling for the return of the Dalai Lama to Tibet. The locations of most self-immolations have a history of major security operations by the Chinese Peoples Armed Police, and intensive state ‘patriotic education campaigns’.
- The various testaments of self-immolators have focused on calls for ethnic unity and patriotism amongst Tibetans. This is shared by both monastic and lay self-immolators, and is in many respects a sea-change in line with wider shifts in Tibetan political sentiment since the protests and riots of 2008. The self-immolators’ call has had a profound impact on the morale and political direction of the Tibetan political movement, especially in exile following the Dalai Lama’s political devolution of political powers in 2011.
- The Tibetan exiled community is presently divided over its response to the self-immolations, with the Executive of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile (under newly-elected Prime Minister Lobsang Sangay) calling for restraint, especially in democratic countries where other forms of protest are available; while groups such as the Tibetan Youth Congress support self-immolators as national heroes, and argue that self-immolation is a product of the failure of the international community as a whole, whether in democratic or non-democratic countries, to act on Tibet.
- While it is clear that Tibetans have succeeded in gaining international media attention regarding self-immolation, it nonetheless remains the case that self-immolation remains widespread throughout the PRC as a whole, part of a wider and alarming increase in suicide that are linked not to the prevalence of depressive disorders, but rather to the acute stresses produced by the profound economic and political changes sweeping the PRC, which are overwhelming individual, local and cultural needs.

Self-Immolations in Tibet



Introduction

Since 2009, almost forty Tibetans have committed self-immolation, either in Tibet, India or Nepal, in protest against Chinese rule or policies in the region. This form of protest, unknown amongst Tibetans prior to the 1990s, has quickly escalated, particularly in the Eastern Tibetan regions of Kham and Amdo and, in combination with the large scale street protests and funerals that attend such self-immolations, is presenting the Chinese authorities with serious problems of local policing, as well as being increasingly damaging to the country's international reputation. More broadly, this most final form of protest has often been attended by testaments and wills by self-immolators that are increasingly galvanising Tibetan opinion both inside and outside China around notions of nationalism and cultural loyalty in ways unseen in the last thirty years.

The Development of Self-Immolation as a Form of Tibetan Protest

The first publicly recorded Tibetan self-immolation did not occur in Tibet itself, but India. On 27th September 1998, sixty-year old Thubten Ngodup, an ex-army pensioner who lived in Dharamsala and had spent much of his youth as a monk in Tashilhunpo monastery in Tibet, doused himself in gasoline and set fire to himself in Central Delhi when the Indian police authorities tried to forcibly remove Tibetan protesters who were carrying out an extended hunger strike to highlight conditions in Tibet.

Ngodup's subsequent death galvanised the Tibetan exiled community, who had become increasingly disenchanted with the persistent failure of existing exiled policies to achieve either meaningful change in Tibet or even systematic dialogue between Dharamsala and Beijing. However, it was not until 2009 that the present spate of self-immolations began in earnest, with the self-immolation of the twenty-seven year old monk Tapey in Ngaba (Ch. Aba) county town. Ngaba town and its associated Kirti monastery have been the focus of long-running tensions over the last ten years, with the closure of Tibetan-language and monastic schools. On the 18th March 2008, 23 protesting Tibetans were reported killed by security forces during the protests that spread across the Tibetan Autonomous Region and surrounding Tibetan-populated areas. Kirti Monastery itself is reported to have been under a state of lockdown for several years, with a large security presence of up to five garrisons having built up in the area. Tapey, who was protesting the cancellation of New Year religious services at Kirti Monastery, Ngaba, raised a Tibetan flag and photograph of the Dalai Lama before setting himself on fire at a market crossroads. He was shot by security services as he burned, and subsequently arrested. His whereabouts remain unknown.

Two years later, in March 2011, Lobsang Phuntsok, another monk from Kirti Monastery, set fire to himself in Ngaba town, this time fatally. Combined, these began a long series of self-immolations and protests around Kirti monastery, representing almost half the self-immolators (twenty up to 30th March 2012). Other areas where such protests have occur stretch across the eastern regions of the Tibetan Plateau: in particular the towns of Rebkong, Barkham, Tawu, Charu and Chamdoⁱⁱ. These five locations, all in eastern Tibet, have presented the overwhelming majority of self-immolations; all of these areas are also linked to histories of wider communal protest against Chinese rule, especially in 2008ⁱⁱⁱ.





Figure 2: Thubten Ngodup, the first Tibetan self-immolator



Figure 3: The self-immolation of Palden Choetso in Tawu Town, 30th Dec 2011.

The pace of self-immolations has increased dramatically in recent months: by March 2012, it had reached almost ten per month, from one per month at this point in 2011. Most self-immolators have thus far been Tibetan Buddhist monks (20 up to 30-3-2012), former monks (7) and nuns (3), but the number also includes a students and working laypeople. Most self-immolations draw large crowds of Tibetans and often erupt into spontaneous protests, especially if there is any conflict over possession of the body with local security forces. The funerals of self-immolators are now becoming mass gatherings that attract thousands from across the local Tibetan population. Whilst generally peaceful, these funerals constitute a major challenge to local security forces and have been regularly blocked in situations where the authorities have control of the body^{iv}. In many cases, the fate of injured self-immolators is simply unknown, and families have not been informed. In many cases, family members and associates have been subject to arrest and detention.



Interpreting Self-Immolation

Considerable controversy exists within the international sphere as to how to interpret the recent wave of self-immolations by Tibetans. While the general consensus is that the self-immolations are a political acts to express people's rejection of China's repressive policies in Tibet, the Chinese authorities, through media such as *China Tibet Online* and *TibetInfor*, have sought to portray them as either the result of individual hooliganism or mental instability, or occurring at the direct instigation of the 'Dalai clique'^v (shorthand for the Tibetan Government-in-Exile). However, these latter endeavours have been more muted than is usual for such protests, and in general the principal Chinese state response has been to limit media access of any kind.

Both within China and in the international media, a principal issue that has arisen is the extent to which such acts are 'Buddhist' in nature. Many have denounced self-immolation as being a violent act, and therefore opposed to the religious ethics supposedly espoused by Buddhist monks and nuns. Others, by contrast, have argued that self-immolation, while egregious, nonetheless harms no-one else and is therefore a non-violent mode of protest^{vi}, and that giving up one's life for the sake of others (here, the Tibetan people and cause) is the action of a *bodhisattva*, or Buddhist hero. Several commentators (and at least two self-immolators) have pointed out tales from the Buddha's previous lives in which he gave up his life to save others, in one particular case through self-immolation. Debate has also centred on the use of terms such as 'desperate' and 'despairing' by the international media to describe self-immolators, which has been roundly rejected by groups such as the Tibetan Youth Congress and Free

Tibet, who unanimously portray self-immolators as *gyalché pawo*, 'national heroes' who are transforming a moribund Tibetan cause.

It is clear that acts of self-immolation fuse together religious and political aspirations amongst Tibetans. Lama Sopa Rinpoche (photo, right), a respected incarnate lama who self-immolated in Northeast Tibet in January 2012, declared in a final tape recording:

"This is the 21st century, and this is the year in which so many Tibetan heroes have died. I am sacrificing my body both to stand in solidarity with them in flesh and blood, and to seek repentance through this highest tantric honor of offering one's body. This is not to seek personal fame or glory. I am giving away my body as an offering of light to chase away the darkness, to free all beings from suffering, and to lead them – each of whom has been our mother in the past and yet has been led by ignorance to commit immoral acts – to the Amitabha, the Buddha of infinite light. My offering of light is for all living beings, even as insignificant as lice and nits, to dispel their pain and to guide them to the state of enlightenment. I offer this sacrifice as a token of long-life offering to our root guru His Holiness the Dalai Lama and all other spiritual teachers and lamas."^{vii}



Figure 5: Sopa Rinpoche, self-immolated Darlag county town, 8 January 2012

Whilst most self-immolators carry out the acts themselves to a now almost formulaic cry of "Long Live the Dalai Lama! Freedom for Tibet!", an increasing number such as Sopa Rinpoche have left behind testaments to explain their acts, the contents of which are proving extremely influential both inside and outside Tibet. Arguably, such statements are re-setting the political and moral landscape of resistance to Chinese rule in Tibet in the wake of the Dalai Lama's devolution of political powers to an elected leadership in 2011. Unlike most forms of Tibetan protest testament over the last thirty years, most of these new statements are not aimed at the international community, but at fellow Tibetans, calling upon them to develop and maintain unity and to build up a sense of patriotism (*lagya*) in the face of Chinese rule. These ideas have been evoked by both lay and monastic self-immolators. Jampal Yeshe, the 27-year-old student from Tawu town in Eastern Tibet who burnt himself to death in Delhi on March 26th 2012, wrote in his "Five Point Testament":

"My fellow Tibetans! If you care about your happiness and future, you must have the spirit of patriotism. Patriotism is the soul of a nation. Moreover, it is the confidence in search of truth; and also the harbinger of a happy future. My fellow Tibetan! If we are spire to peace and happiness in par with other people around the world, we should hold dear to your heart the word 'patriotism'. You should make effort in all deliberations, big or small. In general, 'patriotism' is the insight that distinguishes truth from falsehood."^{viii}



Figure 6: Jampel Yeshe, self-immolated Delhi, 26th March 2012

Similarly, Sopa Rinpoche concluded his testament with the following call to Tibetans:

"To all my spiritual brothers and sisters, and the faithful ones living elsewhere: You must unite and work together to build a strong and prosperous Tibetan nation in the future. This is the sole wish of all the Tibetan heroes. Therefore, you must avoid any quarrelling amongst yourselves whether it is land disputes or water disputes. You must maintain unity and strength. Give love and education to the children, who should study hard to master all the traditional fields of studies. The elders should carry out spiritual practice as well as maintain and protect Tibetan language and culture by using all your resources and by involving your body, speech and mind. It is extremely important to genuinely practice

Buddhist principles in order to benefit the Tibetan cause and also to lead all sentient beings towards the path of enlightenment. Tashi Delek."

Official and Public Attitudes to Self-Immolation

Chinese state media organisations have been swift to blame the 'Dalai clique' for either instigating or encouraging self-immolation as a means to promote separatism within the PRC. While it is certainly the case that the Executive of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile has been urging Tibetans inside and outside Tibet not to resort to 'extreme actions', Tibetan civil society honours self-immolators as national heroes. There is a general consensus amongst the exiled Tibetan communities to stand in solidarity with the cause of the self-immolators. Contrary to the allegations of the Chinese government, the Dalai Lama has always clearly stated that "human life is precious" and that he does not endorse activities involving the loss of lives, including one's own. This message was communicated as early as in 1998, when several Tibetans undertook a hunger strike in Delhi. Responding to an 18 April 2012 BBC interview on why he does not speak out on the self-immolations, the Dalai Lama said: "Now this is very, very sensitive political issue. If I get involved in that, then the retirement from political power is meaningless. Whatever I say the Chinese government they immediately manipulate." In an earlier interview with the Wall Street Journal on 20 March 2012, the Dalai Lama called the self-immolations "very, very sad" and concluded. "Now, I have nothing to say. Only pray"^{ix}.

As of March 2012, the Tibetan Government-in-Exile's official strategy has been to discourage self-immolation while recognising the moral worth of each action. In doing this, the CTA distinguish between self-immolation inside and outside Tibet, as seen in their response to Jampal Yeshe's death in Delhi:

"The CTA would like to reiterate that as Buddhists, life is precious. In the long-term interest of the Tibetan cause, we urge Tibetans to focus on secular and monastic education to provide the necessary human resources and the capability to strengthen and sustain our movement. We once again remind Tibetans to refrain from drastic actions. While Tibetans inside Tibet live under the repressive system imposed by the Chinese government, with no space for conventional means of protest such as demonstrations, hunger strikes, etc. Tibetans living in the free world have freedom and space for conventional means of protests which should be utilised to the fullest. Therefore, the Central Tibetan Administration reiterates its appeal to all Tibetans and Tibet supporters to express their solidarity through activities which are peaceful, legal and dignified. We urge everyone to remain calm in light of the latest emotionally-charged circumstances."^x

The CTA's position has been challenged by the Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC), the unofficial 'opposition' within the Tibetan refugee community. Pochung Dhondup Lhadar, Vice-President of the TYC, rejected the CTA's distinction between democratic and non-democratic states in the modern context, because of the general human rights failure of the international community as a whole:

"The leaders of this world have no right to talk about peace, freedom and equality. The twenty-first century only belongs to violence and economic might. The twenty-first century is a century shrouded in darkness ... Those who choose to self-immolate do not do so on a whim, on the spur of the moment. They think about it at length, they make a firm decision, and make plans. They decide to do this for the good of the nation and the good of all of those around them. If someone chooses to self-immolate, therefore, those who share the same cause as them should not stop them or try to save them, because in doing so they deny the fundamental reasoning that caused them to choose this action."^{xi}

Despite such differences of opinion, it is clear that Tibetan self-immolators are vastly honoured both within Tibet and in exile, and their statements carry incalculable moral authority. By most ordinary members of the refugee community, they are seen as a potent beacon of hope in a movement which has languished in the doldrums for more than a decade, and which even the Dalai Lama has denounced as "having mixed results" at best, and a failure at worst^{xiii}.

Causes of the Self-Immolations

While the political merits and religious ethics of self-immolation have been the object of considerable debate, the actual causes of these events have largely been taken for granted. Several aspects of the immolations require attention: (a) its bushfire like development over the last three years; (b) its concentration on specific sites in east and northeast Tibet (that is, Kham and Amdo), to the almost complete exclusion of Central Tibet; (c) the predominance of monks, nuns and students; and (d), the strong emphasis on Tibetan patriotism evoked by the self-immolators themselves.

Firstly, immolations are clearly linked to a massive ramping up of the security presence by the Peoples Armed Police in areas such as Ngaba and Golok, direct internal state control of monasteries, and the stringent application of ideological programmes such as the 'patriotic education campaign' (*rgyal gces ring lugs kyi slob gso las 'gyul*). Such campaigns require monks and nuns to regularly denounce the Dalai Lama, adhere to the CCP's view of Tibetan history as an inalienable part of China, and concede that all legitimate religious commitment was based on loyalty to the state. As the Tibet specialist Tsering Shakya has commented:

"What links the current incidents to religion is that most of the Tibetans who have committed self-immolation have been monks, former monks or nuns. Their actions were not an obeisance to religion or the performing of virtue. Rather, they signify something entirely different: they are a product of "rage," induced by daily humiliation and intolerable demands for conformity and obedience. Religious figures in Tibet have been particularly subjected to the discipline of patriotic education and the campaigns opposing the so-called "Dalai clique." These campaigns, viewed by the monks as a regime of degradation, require them to endlessly feign compliance, obliging them to demonstrate repeatedly their patriotism and fidelity to the Communist Party. That is not an easy task to sustain, and we see that it has finally become something they refuse to do."^{xiii}

Secondly, the new wave of self-immolations seem intimately linked to growing restrictions on both Tibetan religion and language schooling, hence the predominance of monastics and students^{xiv}, many of whom are directly involved in such restrictions. Like Sopa Rinpoche, most immolators that leave testaments call upon their fellow Tibetans to maintain their language and religion as fundamental features of Tibetan patriotism. In many respects, this explains the focus on those eastern Tibetan regions outside the Tibetan Autonomous Region itself, where special regulations protect the local religion and language to a limited amount.

Thirdly, the epidemiology of self-immolation – its clustering in specific towns - points very clearly to the importance of local links and forms of communication. Tibetan self-immolators are clearly inspired by those that went before them, and it seems impossible to discount the impact of large funerals plus the sheer respect that self-immolators receive posthumously as motivating factors for future self-immolators. In this sense, the kind of piecemeal explanations presented by the Chinese authorities - of individual criminality and personal moral failings - are wholly unconvincing, except in the sense that they reveal an official prejudice that all protest is by definition illegitimate and therefore necessarily the inclination of the criminal or the insane.

Finally, such acts are clearly part of a wider growth in political solidarity amongst Tibetans over the last twenty years, and in particular since the 2008 protests. Traditionally, Tibetans have been relatively fragmented in political terms, with political loyalties being local and sectarian within the various Buddhist schools. In particular, political and ethnic schisms endured until recently between Central Tibet (the traditional domain of the Dalai Lamas'administration) and the eastern Tibetan regions of Kham and Amdo^{xv}. Within the last ten years, however, growing calls for Tibetan national unity and patriotism have incorporated outlying Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures in Qinghai, Gansu and Sichuan, the general location of most of the self-immolations.

Self-Immolation within the PRC Context

It is important to note that the growing national patriotism demonstrated within self-immolations and other forms of protest is generally not witnessed within the established exiled communities, and as noted above that these widespread changes within the Tibetan Plateau are ones that the Tibetan Government-in-Exile has had difficulties in coming to terms with. It is clear that a growing cultural and political rift is occurring between those that have spent most or all their lives inside the Tibetan regions of the Peoples Republic of China, and those that have spent all or most of their lives in exile. In this sense, we must look to the larger context of the PRC to understand the recent spate of self immolations.

To begin with, it is impossible not to note that the recent rise in Tibetan political solidarity and patriotism has emerged precisely during the period following the widespread introduction of the Chinese patriotic education campaigns themselves, and the majority of self-immolations have been carried out by those in direct receipt of these ideological campaigns. Indeed, the precise fusion of patriotism and religion that is seen amongst the immolators almost exactly mirrors the patriotic education campaign policy on religion (see above), *but in this case advocating Tibetan rather than Chinese nationalism*. Similar political dynamics have been witnessed in nationalist movements across the globe throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, usually in response to European colonial rule: indigenous populations adopt but invert the logic of rule in order to oppose it.

In much the same way, the kind of self-immolations that we have seen amongst Tibetans in the last three years, whilst innovative in Tibetan cultural terms, are an established aspect of protest across the Peoples Republic of China, in which public suicide plays a major part. Modern China has one of the highest suicide rates in the world - almost 300,000 people a year or 22.23 out of every 100,000, having risen from 13.9 per 100,000 in 1999^{xvi}. This rise shows little connection to rates of depressive disorders^{xvii}, and has been strongly linked to socio-economic changes across the PRC that generate acute financial pressures on individuals (mainly rural women)^{xviii}.

Many such suicides involve public self-immolation^{xix}. Rather than the kind of overtly political suicide seen recently amongst Tibetans, these are carried out by ordinary Chinese farmers and businesspeople who have fallen foul of rapid economic development, but who nonetheless seek to make some kind of public statement of their plight. In 2003, the Beijing authorities created an exception to the general legality of suicide by banning suicide in the sacred paving stones of Tiananmen Square. Such suicides – many of which involved self-immolation - had grown common enough in the Square to warrant special training amongst its attendant police forces. As the Asia Times correspondent Li Yong Yan commented of the affair:

"A public suicide is usually committed to make a public protest over the way the government treats the individual and/or general public. The recent strings of public attempts in Tiananmen are proof enough. Without exception, they are hopeless victims of forced eviction from their homes. Developers, backed by local governments, never talk to the homeowners about a fair agreement. Instead, the developers talk through bulldozers. Powerless against the wrecker's ball, the owners turn to the courts, which turn them away. Then they go to the people's government, which never responds or, if it does, sends police to disperse the protesters. With nowhere else to turn to, they show up in Tiananmen Square, with a bottle of gasoline. Ever the law-abiding citizens, they douse themselves with fuel, and end up being charged with provocative, disorderly behaviour, by the suddenly all-efficient law-enforcement authorities."^{xx}

Information regarding self-immolations across the PRC has not been collated, and in many cases – as with the Tibetan situation - the bodies and survivors of self-immolation have been removed by the authorities, often under mental health regulations, and their whereabouts are unknown.

Therefore, while the Tibetan self-immolations show distinctive forms of cultural expression and communal solidarity not present elsewhere in the PRC, political self-immolation is not a peculiar development of Buddhism or even the Tibetan cause, but seem rather to be a distinctive aspect of a

wider malaise endemic to the modern Chinese state. Whether in Tibetan areas or the larger PRC, they seem to be a response to the combined march towards economic development and political consolidation in the Middle Kingdom in recent years, and are associated with a growing sense that these developments leave little room or security for the ordinary Chinese citizen. and fewer and fewer religious, linguistic and cultural freedoms for Tibetans. That it might lead to the kind of profound rejection of governmental and judicial order witnessed in political self-immolation is a troubling lesson for the entire international community – which is, in effect, all of us - that supports China's prodigious growth.

ⁱ For example, records from Kirti monastery's branch institution in India identified the following cases, that access to the bodies of deceased self-immolators, and therefore denial of funeral rites, occurred in the cases of: Kaying (self-immolated, October 8th 2011), Norbu Dramdul (self-immolated October 15th 2011), Tenzin Choedron (self-immolated February 11th 2012), Tenpa Darjey (April 7th 2012), Losang Sherab (March 28th 2012), Rigzin Dorje (February 8 2012). In each case, the body was not retrieved but relatives were given a small portion of ashes by the authorities later, effectively barring them from the performance of traditional Tibetan Buddhist funeral rites.

ⁱⁱ Since the initial draft of this paper, self-immolations have also been recorded in Lhasa in Central Tibet, an important development in the demography of Tibetan self-immolation.

ⁱⁱⁱ *The 2008 Protests in Tibet: Main Facts & Analysis: Scottish Parliament's Cross-Party Group on Tibet Briefing Paper No. 1.*

^{iv} e.g. "Fiery death marks March 10 commemorations in Tibet", *Phayul* [Tuesday, March 13, 2012],

<http://www.phayul.com/news/tools/print.aspx?id=31056&t=1>; "Tawu tense after monk's self-immolation",

Phayul [Friday, August 19, 2011], <http://www.phayul.com/news/article.aspx?id=29894&t=1>.

^v e.g. China Tibet Online, March 20, 2012. "How the Dalai clique incites self-immolation".

<http://chinatibet.people.com.cn/96069/7762820.html>, accessed 11.05/2012.

^{vi} Samdhong Rinpoche (Prime Minister, Tibetan Government in Exile, 2001-2011): interview, 21st March 2012.

^{vii} Source: <http://www.savetibet.org/media-center/ict-news-reports/harrowing-images-and-last-message-tibet-first-lama-self-immolate>, accessed 12/06/12.

^{viii} Source: <http://choegyaltenzin.com/2012/03/27/wishes-of-the-latest-self-immolator/>, accessed 12/05/12, checked against original Tibetan.

^{ix} Barbara Chai, *The Wall Street Journal*, 21st March 2012. "Dalai Lama Says He'd 'Welcome' Investigation of Tibetan Self-Immolations".

^x Statement by the Press Office of the Central Tibetan Administration, 27th March 2012. Source:

<http://tibet.net/2012/03/27/cta-deeply-saddened-by-self-immolation-incidents/>, accessed 12/05/2012.

^{xi} Pochung Dhondup Lhadar (Vice-President, Tibetan Youth Congress), interview 31/3/2012.

^{xii} NBC's 'Today', 2009. "Dalai Lama Declared Autonomy Proposals A Failure". <http://tibettruth.com/2012/04/11/dalai-lama-declared-autonomy-proposals-a-failure/>

^{xiii} Tsering Shakya (Institute of Asian Research, University of British Columbia). "Transforming the Language of Protest". In *Journal of Cultural Anthropology*, April 2012. <http://culanth.org/?q=node/524>

^{xiv} BBC, 20 October 2010. "Tibetan students in China protest over language policy". <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11581189>, accessed 12/5/2012; BBC, 27 October 2010. "Education reforms anger Tibetans".

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11634364>, accessed 12/5/2012. See also the UN Human Rights Council report on education and language in Qinghai, Document: A/HRC/17/29/Add.1, pp 3-7; <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/17session/reports.htm>.

^{xv} See Shakya, T. 1999. *Dragon in the Land of Snows: A History of Modern Tibet after 1947*. London: Pimlico Press; Shakya, T. 1993. "Whither the tsampa-eaters?". *Himal Journal*. Lopez, D. 1998. *Prisoners of Shangri-la: Tibetan Buddhism and the West*. University of Chicago Press.

^{xvi} World Health Organization "Suicide rates (per 100,000), by gender, China 1987-1999". www.who.int/mental_health/media/chin.pdf

^{xvii} Law, Samuel and Liu, Pozi (February, 2008), "Suicide in China: Unique demographic patterns and relationship to depressive disorder", *Current Psychiatry Reports* (Current Psychiatry Reports) 10 (1): 80–86.

^{xviii} Phillips, Michael R.; Liu, Huaqing; Zhang, Yanping (November 3, 2004), "Suicide and Social Change in China", *Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry* 23: 25–50.

^{xix} For example: Human Rights Watch, 2004, *Demolished: Forced Evictions and the Tenants' Rights Movement in China*, 25 March 2004, C1604, available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/412dec764.html>; *Amnesty International*, "One Petitioner Detained, Another Missing After Preparing for Self-Immolation Near Tiananmen", China Human Rights Briefing January 4-9, 2012, <http://www2.amnesty.org.uk/blogs/countdown-china/china-human-rights-briefing-january-4-9-2012>; BBC, 17 November 2011: "Chinese man in Tiananmen Square self-immolation protest", <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-15768036>; 媒体详述江西宜黄拆迁自焚事件始末, <http://www.sina.com.cn> 2010年10月01日; "Burning issue", *Chinadaily.com.*; "China's demolition policy attacked", *Taipei Times*, 18th December 2009; *Spartenburg Herald Journal*, 6th Feb 2000. "Chinese Call Explosion in Tiananmen Square a Suicide".

^{xx} "Beijing tries to snuff out public suicide", *Asia Times*, 23 October 2003, www.atimes.com/atimes/China/EJ29Ado1.html.

Produced and ratified by the Cross Party Group on Tibet, Scottish Parliament, June 2012. Further information on the Scottish Parliament's Cross-Party Group on Tibet can be found at:

<http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/msps/49023.aspx>

<http://scotlandtibet.wordpress.com>.